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ll usWe combine unique administrative and survey data to study the
match between firms and managers. The data include manager char-
acteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial prac-
tices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious
model of matching and incentives generates implications that we
test with our data. We use the model to illustrate how risk aversion
and talent determine how firms select and motivate managers. We
show that empirical links between firm governance, incentives, and
performance, which have so far been studied in isolation, can instead
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AI. Introduction
Personnel economics is concerned with two problems that firms face:
how to find the right employees and how to motivate them. Moreover,
matching and incentive provision are tightly related: different people pur-
sue different goals. A firm should select a hiring policy in view of the in-
centive structure it has in place, and it should select an incentive structure
in view of the people it wants to hire.
In a recent survey, however, Oyer and Schaefer ð2011Þ conclude that
while several studies in personnel economics have made progress on the
understanding of incentive provision, much less attention has been de-
voted to matching. In particular, relatively little is known about the ways
firms and workers generate economic surplus by matching appropriately
and on the mechanism through which firms strategically design job pack-
ages to source appropriate workers. A key obstacle to advancement in this
area has been the dearth of integrated evidence, due to the fact that most
data sets only contain information on one side of the match.
In this paper, we shed light on the matching mechanism using a unique
data set that provides detailed information on employees, firms, and the
contracts that tie them. Our data, which cover a random sample of Italian
managers, draw from a variety of sources: our own manager survey that
contains information on contract, manager, and firm characteristics; man-
agers’ social security data on earnings throughout their career; and firm
balance sheet data. The data contain direct measures of manager charac-
teristics, like risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as owner-
ship and governance structure; contract characteristics, such as sensitivity
to firm performance both through variable pay and implicit career incen-
tives; and measurable outcomes, such as manager effort and firm perfor-
mance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that—for any
category of workers—firm-level information is combined with such a rich
characterization of managerial preferences and compensation data drawn
from individual social security records.
Our empirical analysis is guided by a simple model where firms and
managers match through the choice of incentive policies, and entry deci-
sions, manager-firm matches, compensation schemes, effort exertion, and
firm performance are endogenously determined. The model generates an
array of predictions, which can be tested on our data. Our contribution is
twofold. First, we show empirically for the first time that managers’ risk
aversion and talent are correlated with the incentives they are offered and,
through these, with the characteristics of the firms that hire them. Second,
we observe in our data a number of relations that have been reported, inaccess to the data used in this article is available as supplementary material online
Contact the corresponding author, Oriana Bandiera, at o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk.
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Aisolation, in other works. Hence, our contribution is to show that, for the
set of workers and firms under consideration, these regularities can be un-
derstood within a parsimonious theoretical framework.
The model is based on the following primitives: a continuum of po-
tential managers, who have heterogenous talent and risk aversion; a con-
tinuum of potential firms, which differ by the weight their owners put on
the private benefit of control vis-a`-vis profits and by their idiosyncratic
cost or revenue component; and a set of possible contracts that manag-
ers and firms can sign, defined by a fixed compensation and the slope of
the performance-based component. The power of the contract should be
viewed broadly, both as explicit incentives ðbonusÞ and implicit incentives
ðpromotions and dismissalsÞ.
Implicit and explicit incentives could also depend on other dimensions,
like the willingness of the manager to provide private benefits to the firm
owners. The incentive scheme could therefore be low-powered on perfor-
mance but high-powered on other dimensions, which we do not observe
directly. In what follows, unless explicitly mentioned, “incentive power”
refers to the performance component only.
The framework illustrates how managers and firms match through in-
centives. Other things equal, managers who are risk averse and have lit-
tle talent prefer low-powered incentives. Other things equal, firm own-
ers who put a higher weight on the private benefit of control rather than
profits also prefer low-powered incentives because high-powered incen-
tives give managers a large stake in the firm’s profit and therefore increase
the probability that managers will oppose owners who want to extract pri-
vate benefits at the expense of profits. This means that certain owners may
be willing to trade off higher profits arising from good management to con-
tain the risk of losing control.1
An equilibrium is such that ðiÞ firms are active if and only if their ex-
pected payoff is nonnegative; ðiiÞ managers are employed if and only if
they receive at least their reservation utility; ðiiiÞ matches between firms,
managers, and contracts are stable, even taking into consideration inactive
firms and managers; ðivÞ contracts between matched firms and managers
are optimal; and ðvÞ managers exert the optimal amount of effort given
their contract. It is important to stress that our model does not assume
an exogenous distribution of active firms or managers. In equilibrium,
only firms that generate a nonnegative payoff to their owners will be ac-
tive. Similarly, only managers who can create a positive surplus for some1 The owner/manager of an Italian firm puts it in colorful terms: “I’d rather be
worth 100 million euros, have fun now, and enjoy people’s respect when I am the
senile chairman of my firm than be worth a billion and get paid fat dividends by a
little ******* with a Harvard MBA, who runs my firm and lectures me at board
meetings.” This comment was related to us in an e-mail by a top-50 European
CEO with a Harvard MBA. Our translation.
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Afirm will be employed as managers. Thus one can think of the underlying
population as containing all potential firms and all potential managers.
Rather than trying ex post to correct for a “survivor bias,” our model offers
a set of testable predictions on observed matches that build on equilibrium
entry conditions.
We show that there exists a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is char-
acterized by assortative matching and yields four testable implications:
ðiÞ in a stable assignment of managers to firms, the slope of the contract a
firm offers is positively correlated to the talent of a manager and negatively
correlated to his/her risk aversion; ðiiÞ managerial outcomes are linked to
incentives: in equilibriummanagers who face steep contracts exert a higher
level of effort, receive a higher expected compensation ðboth total and var-
iableÞ, and obtain a higher overall expected utility; ðiiiÞ firms whose own-
ers put more weight on the private benefit of control are less likely to offer
more performance-sensitive contracts; ðivÞ firms that offer more high-
powered incentives have higher profits. While each individual prediction is
consistent with other models, we are not aware of a framework that can
account for all four of them.
The aim of our empirical analysis is to present evidence on the rich set
of equilibrium correlations suggested by the theory. We base our results
on a unique data set that we created with the purpose of studying both
matching and incentives. As discussed above, its defining feature is that
it combines detailed information on all three components of the match,
namely, manager and firm characteristics and the contracts that tie them.
The survey was administered to 603 individuals sampled from the universe
of Italian service sector executives. Our sample managers rank high in the
hierarchy of the firms they work for: 60% report directly to the CEO and
a further 28% to the board. We also observe the managers’ compensation
history since their first appearance on the labor market from social secu-
rity records, and we have standard accounting data on the firms.
We report four key findings in line with the four theoretical predictions
above. First, we find that policies that create a tighter link between perfor-
mance and reward attract managers who are more talented and more risk
tolerant. Using an index that summarizes the “contract” between firms and
managers—whether firms reward, promote, and dismiss managers based
on their performance—we show that firms offering a one standard devia-
tion steeper contract are 16 percentage points more likely to attract high-
talent managers compared to the sample mean and that the ones they at-
tract have a degree of risk tolerance that is 10% above the mean. The latter
result speaks to the debate on the trade-off between risk and incentives.
In line with classic agency theory, but contrary to most available evidence
ðPrendergast 2002Þ, measures of risk tolerance and incentive power are
positively related in our data.Ourfindings can, however, be reconciledwith
the existing evidence by noting that wemeasure the agent’s risk preferencesThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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Adirectly rather than relying on proxies for risk aversion such as the agent’s
wealth or using variation in the riskiness of the environment instead of the
agent’s preferences. Our estimates therefore do not suffer from the endog-
enous matching or the bias correlated with unobservables discussed in
Ackerberg and Botticini ð2002Þ and Prendergast ð2002Þ,2 respectively.3
Second, we find that managers who are offered steeper contracts exert
more effort, receive higher fixed and variable pay, receive more nonpecu-
niary benefits, and ðnot obviouslyÞ are more satisfied with their job. For
instance, raising our incentive index by one standard deviation is associ-
ated with an increase in the probability that the manager works more than
60 hours a week by 16% of the sample mean, an increase in variable pay by
a third of the sample mean, and higher chances that he/she is very satisfied
with his/her job as large as 12% of the sample mean. Reassuringly, the es-
timated correlation between incentives and pay is robust to using admin-
istrative ðand thus objectiveÞ social security earnings data instead of our
survey measures: hence, the correlation is not due to reporting errors or to
survey reporting biases. Even more interesting, when we use the time var-
iation in social security earnings to compute the volatility of managers’
earnings through time, we find that steeper incentives are correlated with
observed higher earnings variability, consistent with the fact that steeper
contracts ðas measured in the surveyÞ imply that the managers bear more
risk ðas measured in observed time series of earningsÞ.
Third, we use information on the firms’ ownership structure to test
whether the incentive packages offered byfirms depend on theweight their
owners put on the benefit of private control. More specifically, we exploit
the variation between family-owned and widely-held firms. This choice is
rooted in the family firms literature ðdiscussed belowÞ, which documents
how family-owners often perceive the firm as an opportunity to address
family issues and frictions. In this context, owners attribute a value to
the firm as an “amenities provider,” even though the provision of such2 Prendergast ð2002Þ argues that delegation is more likely when the environment
is more uncertain and that because performance pay is positively correlated with
delegation, this generates a spurious positive correlation between environment un-
certainty and incentive power when the degree of delegation is unobservable. Ack-
erberg and Botticini ð2002Þ argue that a spurious positive correlation can emerge
because risk-loving agents are endogenously matched to risky environments and
at the same time prefer high-powered incentives.Using agents’wealth as a proxy for
risk aversion does not solve the problem because the riskiness of the environment is
correlated with the error through the proxy error.
3 Our findings are complementary to existing evidence on executive pay that
shows a negative correlation between stock volatility and pay performance sensi-
tivity ðAggarwal and Samwick 1999Þ. That literature focuses on endogenous var-
iations in risk due to the characteristics of the environment,whereaswemeasure the
characteristics of the managers that determine their preferences for performance
pay.
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Aamenities might not be profit maximizing. In this context, direct control
is extremely valuable as it minimizes the probability that other external
owners might oppose the extraction of such private benefits. On the other
extreme, diffused ownership makes it much harder for a single owner to
extract private benefits from the firm. In line with this view, we find that,
compared to widely-held firms, family-owned firms offer flatter compen-
sation schemes. Namely, family firms are less likely to offer bonuses as a
function of individual or team performance, to promote and fire their man-
agers based on their performance, and to use formal appraisals throughout
a manager’s career. Differences are sizable: unconditionally, the difference
between the percentage of widely-held and family-owned firms that offer
performance bonuses is 13 percentage points, and the corresponding dif-
ference among firms that offer fast track promotions for exceptional per-
formers is 9 percentage points. Controlling for sector and firm size, we
show that the incentive index is significantly weaker for family firms—
up to 30% of one standard deviation. These findings are consistent with
an established view that, compared to anonymous and institutional share-
holders, large individual owners use corporate resources to generate ego
rents, on-the-job amenities, or asset diversion ðDemsetz and Lehn 1985Þ.
Such activities are mostly noncontractible, and they require effective direct
control. They become more difficult when the firm is run by talented out-
siders whose pay depends on firm performance—hence, the comparative
disadvantage of family firms in the provision of managerial incentives.
Fourth, we estimate the correlation between incentives and firm per-
formance measures from balance sheet data and find that firms that offer
high-powered incentives have higher productivity, profits, and returns on
capital. This is consistent with a Demsetzian view that, in equilibrium, ac-
tive but underperforming firms must offer some other form of reward to
their owners.
Although some of these findings have been observed in isolation by
other authors ðmore detail is provided in the Literature Review sectionÞ,
the value-added of this paper lies in showing that these relations all hold
for the same set of firms and managers and can all be accounted for by our
parsimonious matching model. Furthermore, while our data do not allow
us to identify causal relations directly, the consistency of all the correla-
tions we estimate with the predictions of the model strongly supports its
validity. Being able to observe all sides of the match allows us to rule out
alternative theories that might be consistent with a subset of the corre-
lations we report but not the whole set.44 One such prominent alternative is that family firms have a more effective
monitoring technology and hence do not need to offer high-powered incentives. If
that hypothesis were driving the results, however, we would expect managers who
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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AThe rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II is a review of the
literature. Section III discusses the theoretical model and illustrates its
main testable predictions. Section IV presents our data and shows how we
map the model’s variables into their empirical counterparts. Section V
shows the evidence. VI discusses the robustness of our results. Section VII
summarizes and concludes.
II. Literature Review
The main contribution of our paper is to integrate phenomena in per-
sonnel economics that are usually analyzed individually. On the theory
side, our model belongs to the manager-firm assignment literature ini-
tiated by Rosen ð1982Þ. Two recent papers ðGabaix and Landier 2008;
Tervio¨ 2008Þ provide tractable CEO-firm matching models, where CEOs
differ on talent and firms differ on size and productivity. Our model is
particularly close to an independent paper by Edmans and Gabaix ð2011Þ,
which endogenizes the contract between the CEO and the firm and ob-
tains a concise close-form characterization of equilibrium incentives and
matches. Like us, they endogenize both worker-firm matching and incen-
tive provision. The main difference is that the main source of heteroge-
neity on the firm side is size in their model and governance in ours. Also,
their managers differ only on talent ðrisk comes into play indirectly as tal-
ented managers are wealthierÞ, while our managers differ on both talent
and innate risk attitude.5
The argument that talented workers are matched to firms that offer
high-powered incentives was made by Lazear ð1986Þ and further devel-
oped by Balmaceda ð2009Þ. While in those models firms are ex ante iden-
tical, our firms differ because of ownership. Moreover, our managers differ
on both talent and risk attitude.
On the empirical side, the four findings discussed above relate to four
lively strands of literature that we now briefly discuss. The first set of
results—equilibrium matching—is close to the large literature on firm-
employee matching ðsee Lazear and Oyer ½2007 for a reviewÞ. The dis-
tinctive feature of our work is that we highlight one possible determinant
of the match value, namely, the firms’ and the managers’ preferences over
high-powered incentives. Our findings are complementary to Lazear5 While Edmans and Gabaix ð2011Þ and our paper utilize related models, the set
of empirical questions that they ask is different. They calibrate their model with
US data and show that the potential loss from talent allocation is much larger than
the potential loss from inefficient contracting.
are better monitored to work harder and to have a higher fixed wage to compen-
sate for the higher effort. Our estimates indicate that the opposite is true: managers
who face weaker incentives work less hard and have a lower base wage. Section VI
discusses this and other alternative explanations in more detail.
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Að2000Þ, which shows that incentive pay attracts more productive blue-
collar workers. Taken together the two sets of findings provide consistent
evidence that incentives are an important determinant of the match be-
tween firms and workers at all levels of the hierarchy.6
An important determinant of matching patterns, explored by Gabaix
and Landier ð2008Þ and Tervio¨ ð2008Þ, is firm heterogeneity in terms of
size. While the main focus of this paper is governance, our empirical anal-
ysis always controls for size. Our analysis confirms the presence of the
strong complementarity between size, talent, and pay predicted by the as-
signment models described above. In our sample, more talented managers
are matched with larger firms, and the level of managerial pay increases
with firm size. Friebel and Giannetti ð2009Þ study endogenous matching
between firms and workers. In their model, large firms have better access
than small firms to financing, but they also investigate new ideas more
thoroughly and are more likely to reject them. Workers differ in their cre-
ativity, namely, in how likely they are to have promising ideas. The authors
characterize the matching equilibrium and analyze the effects of relaxing
individual borrowing constraints. The key predictions of the model are
consistent with evidence available from the US Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances. While we consider a different set of employees—managers rather
than creative workers—and we utilize a different empirical approach—a
purpose-designed employee-employer survey—our paper shares Friebel
and Giannetti’s goal of identifying the role of talent and risk aversion in
the allocation of workers to firms.7
The second set of results relates to the vast literature ðsummarized in
Lazear and Oyer ½2007Þ on how incentives affect worker behavior. In line
with most of that body of work, our managers appear to work harder
when they face steeper contracts. The results also relate to the literature
that seeks to explain the correlation between pay for performance, pay
levels, and inequality both for CEOs ðHall and Liebman 1998Þ and work-
ers in general ðLemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 2009Þ. We contribute to
the debate by measuring contract steepness directly, as our survey records
whether both pay and career progressions are related to performance. In6 Our rich data allow us to overcome the identification issue pinpointed by
Eeckhout and Kircher ð2011Þ. As they show, wage data alone are not sufficient to
identify matching patterns. However, we have direct information on worker and
firm characteristics.
7 Other examples of recent worker-firm endogenous matching models include
Garicano and Hubbard ð2007Þ, for law firms, and Besley and Ghatak ð2005Þ and
Francois ð2007Þ, for the nonprofit sector. See also Rose and Shepard’s ð1997Þ analy-
sis of the link between firm diversification and CEO compensation. The authors
provide evidence that managers of diversified companies appear to be paid more.
By comparing the compensation of newly appointed and experienced CEOs, the
paper shows that the premium is due to higher ability rather than entrenchment.
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Acontrast, the existing literature relies on outcome measures either by re-
gressing total pay on firm performance or by measuring whether workers
have received bonuses during their employment with the firm.
The third set of results—how ownership affects managerial practices—
relates to a number of works at the intersection of personnel economics
and corporate governance ðBertrand and Schoar 2003; Burkart, Panunzi,
and Shleifer 2003; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Leslie and Oyer 2008Þ,
which study firm ownership as the key firm characteristic that drives the
adoption of different managerial practices. The distinction between con-
centrated and diffuse ownership is a particularly salient one in that liter-
ature.8
Our findings can be seen as a validation of the “cultural” view of family
firms ðBertrand and Schoar 2003Þ. The objective function of family own-
ers contains a nonmonetary component. We interpret this as family firms
valuing direct control per se, so that retaining direct control gives rise to
private benefits that the owner ðthe familyÞ can enjoy in addition to the
utility from monetary profits. Private benefits can be derived from the
status associated with leading a business, from the “amenity potential” of
influencing the firm’s choices ðDemsetz and Lehn 1985Þ, from the use of
firm resources for personal purposes, or from the opportunity to use the
firm to address family issues, for example, finding a prestigious job for a
low-ability offspring. Valuing direct control is not inconsistent with fam-
ily ownership per se having a positive effect on performance because, for
instance, trust among family members can substitute for poor governance,
as suggested by Burkart et al. ð2003Þ. Our model indeed allows for family
firms to have a comparative advantage on other dimensions.
Finally, the results on the link with firm performance relate to the lit-
erature on human resources management and, more specifically, manage-
rial practices ðIchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Black and Lynch
2001; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Bonin et al. 2007Þ. In particular, we
contribute to the literature on the effect of family ownership on perfor-
mance through the choice of CEO and management ðBertrand and Schoar
2003; Pe´rez-Gonza´lez 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Lippi and Schivardi
2010Þ. Like these papers, we find that family firms may twist the choice of
the manager toward less talented ones and thus provide a rationale for
why they might perform worse even when not intrinsically less efficient—
as the family firm owner’s quote reported earlier seems to suggest. While
in these papers what affects firm performance is the refusal to choose from
a wider set of managers and instead rely on the restricted pool of family
ðor social networkÞ members, in our case, performance may be affected8 For evidence on the relevance of family ownership, see La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer ð1999Þ, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang ð2000Þ, and Faccio and
Lang ð2002Þ.
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Abecause less able and risk-tolerant managers self-select into family busi-
nesses at any time, not only at succession. This may be the case even
among family businesses that choose to be run by professional managers.
Our finding that family firms offer contracts that attract risk-averse and
less talented managers and pay them less is consistent with Sraer and Thes-
mar ð2007Þ, which shows that, compared to widely-held firms, French fam-
ily firms employ less skilled workers, offer long-run labor contracts that
provide implicit insurance, and pay lower wages. Our paper is complemen-
tary with work by Cai et al. ð2008Þ. While in our study we compare man-
agers in nonfamily firms with nonfamily managers in family firms, Cai et al.
focus their attention on the difference between family managers and out-
side managers employed by family firms. Evidence from their detailed sur-
vey of Chinese family firms reveals that outside managers are offered con-
tracts that are more performance sensitive. Our paper and theirs taken
together indicate that governance issues play a key role in the process of
selecting and motivating managerial talent.
III. Theory
This short theoretical section adapts a workhorse agency model—linear
contracts, quadratic payoffs, and normally distributed additive noise—to
the problem at hand. Our main contribution lies in allowing heterogeneity
on both sides of the managerial market and in letting the terms of the con-
tract be decided by the two parties. While some of our results have already
been discussed individually elsewhere and none of them will surprise peo-
ple familiar with agency problems, it is useful to provide a unified concep-
tual framework to interpret the rich set of patterns that emerge from our
data.
This section presents an informal analysis of the model. A formal char-
acterization and all the proofs are available in appendix A. As the model is
quite rich and nonstandard—two dimensions of heterogeneity on the work-
ers’ side, two dimensions of heterogeneity on the firms’ side, endogenous
contracts—it is developed in a simple function environment that allows us
to obtain close-form solutions.
A. Model
To produce, a firm requires one manager. Suppose firm i is matched
with manager j. The manager generates a product
yj 5
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
xj 1 εj
 
;
where xj ≥ 0 is the effort level chosen by the manager, vj is the manager’s
talent, and εj is normally distributed with mean zero and variance j
2 and is
uncorrelated across firms ðor managersÞ. The parameter vj will be dis-
cussed shortly.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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AThe wage that firm i pays to manager j is a linear function of the pro-
ductivity signal:
wij 5 a
i 1 biyj:
The parameter bi represents the link between pay and performance. In its
more direct interpretation, bi captures an explicit variable pay scheme in
the classic agency theory tradition ðRoss 1973; Holmstrom 1979; Shavell
1979Þ, with the restriction to linear contacts ðHolmstrom and Milgrom
1987Þ. In a less direct interpretation, bi represents an implicit career-based
incentive scheme, as modeled by Holmstrom ð1999Þ and documented by
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom ð1994a, 1994bÞ. Compensation wij is de-
termined by promotions and wage increases, which in turn are connected
to performance yj. This generates a reduced-form link between performance
andwage, whose strength is summarized by bi. Thus, broadly speaking, the
parameter bi can be seen as the power of the implicit and explicit incentive
scheme that the manager faces in firm i.
The manager has a CARA ðconstant absolute risk aversionÞ utility
function
Uj 5 2expgj

wij 2
1
2
x2

;
where gj denotes j’s risk aversion coefficient. There is a mass of potential
managers whose human capital vj and risk aversion coefficient gj are uni-
formly and independently distributed on a rectangle 0; g½   0; v . The total
mass is gv.9 To avoid difficult signaling and screening issues, we assume that
the characteristics of individual managers ðv, gÞ are observable.10
We now turn to firms. The owners of firm i pursue the following ob-
jective:
Vi 5 P i 1 12 fg
 
G i;
where P i denotes the standard corporate profit, while G i represents some
other form of benefit that the owners may receive from the company. This
benefit has to do with direct control and can be material ðuse of company
resources for personal entertainmentÞ or of a less tangible sort ðthe status9 An important assumption here is that talent and risk aversion are indepen-
dently distributed. While there is some evidence that ðcognitiveÞ ability is posi-
tively related to risk taking ðFrederick 2005Þ, in our data there appears to be no
correlation between risk attitudes and measures of human capital.
10 If the characteristics were not observable, the manager would have an incen-
tive to pretend that he/she is more talented than he/she actually is. However, given
vj, the manager would have no incentive to misrepresent his/her risk attitudes be-
cause the contract that he/she is offered in equilibriummaximizes his/her expected
utility given his/her risk aversion coefficient gj.
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Athat derives from managing a company, the utility of keeping the firm “in
the family,” or the guarantee of prestigious jobs for friends or relativesÞ.11
The expression 1 2 fg represents the weight that the owners put on the
benefit of direct control, and it depends on g, the ownership form. For the
sake of simplicity, in what follows we allow for two types of ownership,
denoted by F and N, although the model can be extended to allow for a
larger variety of ownership structures. The main difference between F and
N lies in the size of parameters fF and fN. In particular, F firms place a
greater weight on direct control than N firms,12 namely, fF < fN.13
The firm’s profit is given by
P i 5 yj 2w
i
j 1 hg 2 k
i;
where the production yj and the compensation wij have already been dis-
cussed. The third term, hg, represents a profit base, which may vary be-
tween F andN firms.We remain agnostic as to whether the difference hN2
hF is positive or negative, and this allows our model to be consistent with
arguments either in favor or against family-firm’s profit advantage. The
fourth term, ki, represents idiosyncratic fixed costs ðor profit opportu-
nitiesÞ faced by different firms. For any ownership type g, there is a po-
tential mass of entrants, and each entrant i is characterized by an idiosyn-
cratic cost ki. We assume that firms are distributed as follows. For every
k ≥ 0, the mass of firms with ki ≤ k is equal to k. Variation in k is needed
to pin down the number of firms in equilibrium.14
The ðpotentialÞ control benefit is given by
G i 5 Gg 2 b
ivj;
where Gg is a constant, which may depend on the ownership form g. The
second term, bivj, captures one of the key ideas of this paper: granting
control to an outside manager dilutes the owners’ ability to extract private
benefits from the firm.1511 In principle, we could allow explicit incentive schemes that reward the pro-
vision of private benefits to the owners. All our predictions would still hold as long
as managerial talent is more important for firm performance than for the pro-
duction of private benefits.
12 In particular, one can assume—although it is not necessary—that N firms
have no direct control benefit: fN 5 1.
13 The results would continue to hold if we assumed Vi 5 ~fgP i 1 ð12 ~fgÞG i.
14 Qualitatively, the results would be unchanged if one assumed that the dis-
tribution of potential F-firms is different from the distribution of potential N-
firms. The entry condition could be extended to allow for the possibility of N-
firms to be bought out by families and F-firms to be sold to the market.
15 Even if one assumes that the benefit Gi does not depend on the manager’s
talent vj directly ðnamely, that G i 5 Gg 2 biÞ, there is still an indirect comple-
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AThe second term is crucial for our analysis and requires a careful dis-
cussion. Why is the control benefit that an owner can extract from his/her
firm decreasing in the manager’s talent and incentive? We view the term
as the reduced form of an unmodeled subgame between the owner and the
manager. Suppose that the owner can obtain a private benefit by misusing
some of the firm’s productive inputs ðbuying a private jet, hiring friends
and family, running a pet project, etc.Þ. Suppose that the manager can
spend effort to prevent the owner from appropriating resources. How
motivated will the manager be to fight back?
Owner appropriation reduces the pool of resources that is available to
the manager. It is reasonable to expect that the amount of resources avail-
able and the manager’s talent are complements in the creation of profits.
The manager’s bonus is then the product of resources  talent  profit
share. The manager’s willingness to fight resource appropriation is an in-
creasing function of bivj.
16
To keep notation to a minimum, we set GN 5 0, and hN 5 0. These two
variables do not affect matching and contract choice; they only determine
the number of N-firms and F-firms that are active in equilibrium. Note
that GF and hF can be positive or negative.
Firm entry is endogenous. In equilibrium, ðiÞ the owners of every active
firm i maximize Vi, and ðiiÞ a firm i is active if and only if the maximized
Vi is greater than the outside option ðnormalized at zeroÞ.17
The time line is as follows: ðiÞ each firm chooses whether to become
active; ðiiÞ amatchingmarket between firms andmanagers opens;manager-
firm pairs sign linear contracts; ðiiiÞ managers who are hired by firms
choose how much effort they exert.
B. Equilibrium
An equilibrium ðin pure strategiesÞ of this model is a situation where
ðaÞ a firm is active if and only if it receives a nonnegative expected payoff;
ðbÞ all manager-firmmatches are stable, namely, no pair made of one man-
ager and one firm, who are currently not matched to each other, can in-
crease their payoffs by leaving their current partners ðif anyÞ and signing
an employment contract with each other; ðcÞ all matched pairs select thementarity between incentives and talent because firms that offer high-performance
schemes attract more talented workers. Hence, one should expect all our main
results to go through ðalbeit in a less tractable settingÞ.
16 One could make this argument explicit in the model. It would require adding
a second dimension to the manager effort ðfighting back the ownerÞ and modeling
the owner’s strategic choices. The theory section would become even longer and
more complex, without much gain.
17 One could have different outside options for F-firms and N-firms, but that
would be equivalent to a change in hF and hN.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
636 Bandiera et al.
Acontract that maximizes joint surplus; ðdÞ all managers choose the optimal
level of effort, given the contracts they have signed.
The present section offers an informal analysis of the model. A formal
result is provided at the end of the section and proven in appendix A.
Let us begin from the last step: effort choice. Given a contract with
slope bi, the manager chooses effort
x^j 5 b
i
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
:
As the surplus created by the relationship can be allocated costlessly to the
firm or the manager through the fixed compensation variable a, the con-
tract between the two parties must maximize the sum of their expected
payoffs. The surplus-maximizing contract has slope
b^i gj
 
5
fg
11 gjj
2
:
The contract power decreases with the risk aversion coefficient of the
manager, gj, and in the profit weight of the firm owners, fg. The manager’s
product, given the optimal contract, is
yj 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
x^j 5
fg
11 gjj
2
vj:
This means that there is a positive complementarity between the profit
weight fg and managerial talent vj and a negative complementarity between
fg and the risk aversion coefficient gj. F-firms have a comparative advan-
tage for low-talent, risk-averse managers.
This comparative advantage translates into a matching equilibrium where
managers with high talent and low risk aversion work for N-firms, man-
agers with medium talent and higher risk aversion work for F-firms, and less
talented managers are unemployed.
To see that this must be the case, consider two managers, A and B, and
assume that A is more talented and less risk averse than B. Suppose, for
contradiction, that A works for an F-firm and B works for anN-firm. The
total surplus ðthe sum of Vi and UjÞ generated by the two firms is lower
than the total surplus that would be generated by the same two firms if
they swapped managers. This means that either the F-firm and manager B
or the N-firm and manager A can increase their joint payoff by leaving
their current partners and forming a new match. The same line of reason-
ing applies to an unemployed manager who is more talented and risk tol-
erant than a manager who is currently employed.
See figure 1 for an example of such a matching equilibrium. Managers
areuniformlydistributedona two-dimensional spaceof talent andrisk aver-This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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FIG. 1.—Equilibrium allocation of managers to firms
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Asion. The space is divided into three regions. The upper-left region contains
talented risk-takers employedbyN-firms.Themiddle region ismade of less
talented and more risk-averse managers who work for F-firms. The man-
agers in the remaining region are unemployed.
The regions in the figure are determined by indifference conditions.
Managers on the line that separates the F-region from the unemployment
region receive an expected utility equal to their outside option. Managers
on the line between the F-region and theN-region are indifferent between
working for an N-firm or for an F-firm.
The expected payoff of firm i is
E Vi½ 5 E P i 1 12 fg
 
G i
 
5 p i 1 E hg 2 k
i 1 12 fg
 
Gg
 
;
where the term
p i 5 E yj 2w
i
j 2 12 fg
 
bivj
h i
can be seen as management-related payoff. Competition among firms
guarantees that all active F-firms have the same management-related pay-
off pF and all activeN-firm have the same management-related payoff pN.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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AThe comparative advantage of N-firms in incentive provision means that
pN > pF.
The size of the F-region in figure 1 corresponds to the mass of F-firms
that are active, nF. Similarly, the size of the N-region equals the mass of
N-firms, nN. The variables nF and nN are determined endogenously by the
free entry condition. Firm i is active if and only if E½Vi ≥ 0. This means
that the F-firm with the lowest payoff satisfies
pF 1 hF 2 k
i 1 12 fFð ÞGF 5 0;
while the N-firm with the lowest payoff satisfies
pN 2 k
i 5 0:
C. Testable Implications
The equilibrium characterization above yields an array of predictions
regarding observable variables, which we group into four implications.
The first set of predictions relates to how managers are matched to in-
centive schemes:
IMPLICATION 1 ðMANAGER-INCENTIVE MATCHÞ. The slope of the con-
tract that manager j faces in equilibrium is negatively correlated with
his/her risk aversion coefficient and positively correlated with his/her
talent.
Implication 1 shows how managerial human capital is matched to firms
in equilibrium. Managers with high risk aversion and low talent face low-
powered incentives. If that was not the case, there could be gains from
breaking existing pairs and forming new matches.
We can also predict how the manager’s effort and his/her performance
will be related to the incentive scheme he/she faces:
IMPLICATION 2 ðMANAGER PERFORMANCEÞ. Controlling for risk aver-
sion, the slope of the contract that manager j faces in equilibrium is
positively correlated with the manager’s ðaÞ effort, ðbÞ variable com-
pensation, ðcÞ total compensation, and ðdÞ utility.
Implication 2 describes what happens to the manager once he/she is
matched to a firm. Managers who face steep contracts work harder. That
is both because of the direct incentive effect and because they are more
talented ðand talent and effort are complementsÞ. As a result, they produce
more output, and they receive more performance-related compensation.
Finally, a revealed preference argument shows that managers who areThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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Aoffered a high contract slope must have a higher utility than managers who
are offered a less steep contract ðbecause being talented can obtain the
same product with less effortÞ.
The third set of predictions relates to incentive power. If an F-firm and
anN-firm hire managers with identical risk aversion, the F-firm will offer
a flatter contract because it has a higher control premium. Formally, fF >
fN implies
b^F gj
 
5
fF
11 gjj
2
<
fN
11 gjj
2
5 b^N gj
 
:
We can write this result as:
IMPLICATION 3 ðFIRM-INCENTIVE MATCHÞ. F-firms offer less steep con-
tracts than N-firms.
This result constitutes a third testable implication: F-firms offer contracts
that are less performance sensitive. Note that this prediction holds a for-
tiori if we do not condition for the manager’s characteristics, as more risk-
averse managers work for F-firms.
An additional prediction of our theory is that managers do not have an
intrinsic productivity advantage in F-firms orN-firms. Implications 1 and
2 imply that all the effects on manager characteristics and performance
come from the incentive structure. Once controlling for incentives, the
data should display no residual firm ownership effect.
The model also makes some predictions on the link between incentive
provision and firm performance. Before getting into that, it is important to
stress that our theory does not say whether performance will be higher in
N-firms or in F-firms. This is for two reasons. First, F-firms may have
some intrinsic business advantage or disadvantage, captured by hF. Sec-
ond, the fixed component of GF determines endogenously the threshold of
idiosyncratic cost ki that induces F-firms to be active and hence endog-
enously determines their performance. As a result, we can construct nu-
merical examples where profits are higher in F-firms and numerical ex-
amples where they are higher in N-firms.
However, our model makes predictions on the correlation between firm
performance and incentive provision, conditional on ownership:
IMPLICATION 4 ðFIRM PERFORMANCEÞ. Controlling for ownership, the
slope of the contract is positively correlated with the firm’s profit P i.
The intuition for this last prediction is immediate. As an increase in the
contract slope bi reduces control benefits, the firms who choose a higher
slope must in equilibrium be compensated with a higher expected profit.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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AIV. Empirical Analysis: Data Description
A. Data Sources
Our empirical analysis exploits three data sources: ðiÞ a novel survey of
Italian managers that we designed to collect detailed information on their
characteristics, the firms they work for, and the incentives they face,
ðiiÞ Amadeus and the Italian Company Accounts Database, which con-
tain information on the firms’ balance sheets, demographics, and employ-
ment levels,18 and ðiiiÞ the Social Security Database, which contains lon-
gitudinal information from administrative records on the managers’ job
position, pay, and employer since they joined the labor force.
The distinctive and unique feature of our survey is that it collects in-
formation on both sides of the market: the firms and the managers they
employ. In particular, we collect measures of the firms’ ownership struc-
ture and details on their incentive policies on three dimensions: bonus pay,
promotion, and dismissal decisions. On the managers’ side, we collect in-
formation on the managers’ risk aversion, talent, work effort, compensa-
tion package, and job satisfaction.
One advantage of using data from a continental European country like
Italy is that all-encompassing rules about collective labor bargaining result
in unambiguous job definitions. The job title of “manager” ðdirigente in
ItalianÞ applies only to the set of workers that have a manager collective
contract, a fact that is recorded by social security data.19 Italy has four
managerial collective agreements: manufacturing, credit and insurance,
trade and services, and public sector.
To avoid dealing with sector-specific contractual provisions, we fo-
cused on the managers in the trade and services sector. Managers in our
sample are selected from the members directory of Manageritalia, an asso-
ciation of professional managers operating in the Italian trade and services
sectors. Importantly, Manageritalia members account for 96% of all man-
agers in the trade and services sectors. Hence, by sampling from the Man-
ageritalia directory, we are sampling from almost the full population of
managers in that sector. These, in turn, make up 20% of all Italian man-18 Amadeus is an extensive accounting database covering more than 9 million
public and private companies across Europe, of which approximatively 580,000 are
in Italy. The Company Accounts Database is based on information provided by
commercial banks that covers all the banks’ largest clients. The data are collected
by Centrale dei Bilanci, an organization established in the early 1980s by the Bank
of Italy and Italian banks with the purpose of recording and sharing information
on borrowers.
19 There is a very clear distinction between being a manager and the closest
collective contract job title, which corresponds to “clerical employee” ðquadro in
ItalianÞ. Indeed the two categories are represented by different trade unions and
have different pension schemes. The difference in terms of social status is also
immediately perceived.
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Aagers.20 The Manageritalia members directory contains 22,100 managers
employed by 8,739 firms. To make certain that we obtain balance sheet
data, we sample from the 2,012 firms that can be matched with Amadeus
and the Italian Company Accounts Database. The balance sheet data sets
and, a fortiori, our sampling universe, are skewed toward large firms. To
maintain comparability across managerial tasks, we focus on managers em-
ployed in the three main operational areas—general administration, finance,
and sales. We randomly assign each firm to one of the three areas and ran-
domly select one manager within each firm. The final sampling universe
contains 605 each of general directors, finance directors, and sales direc-
tors, for a total of 1,815 observations.21
The administration of the survey was outsourced to Erminero & Com-
pany—a well-established survey firm located in Milan, Italy. The 1,815
sample managers were contacted by phone to schedule a subsequent phone
interview, administered by a team of 35 analysts trained by Erminero &
Company and closely monitored by our research team. The response rate
was 33%, with an average duration of 21 minutes per interview. Thus, our
final sample contains 603 observations, equally split across the three oper-
ational areas.22 Our sample managers are highly ranked in the firm hierar-
chy: most of them ð60%Þ report only to the CEO, and a further 28% report
directly to the board. Only 2% rank three levels below the CEO. More-
over, 97.5% of sample managers are outsiders; namely, they do not belong
to the family when the firm is family owned. Reassuringly, respondents and
nonrespondents are employed by observationally identical firms. Indeed
we find no evidence that the probability of participating in the survey is
correlated to firm size, labor productivity, profits, return on capital em-
ployed, or sector ðtable B1 in app. BÞ. Respondents also look similar to
nonrespondents on demographics ðgender and ageÞ and tenure on the job.
Respondents, however, have lower wages, but the difference, while pre-
cisely estimated, is small as the median weekly wage for respondents is 8%
lower than for nonrespondents ð1,648 vs. 1,786Þ. This is consistent with
nonrespondents having a higher opportunity cost of time, as expected. Re-
assuringly, however, the pay distributions have considerable overlap, and,20 Social Security Data indicate that in 2006, the number of individuals em-
ployed on a “manager contract” in the private sector was 117,000. Of these, 23,000
belong to the trade and private services sectors, and 22,100 belong to Manage-
ritalia. Managers working for Italian branches of multinational firms belong to the
trade and services sectors even if the firm itself is classified as industry, e.g., car
manufacturers, as long as no production plants are located in Italy.
21 We do not sample from the 197 firms for which theManageritalia member list
does not contain managers employed in the main three operational areas.
22 In our regressions, we always include controls for manager operational area.
We also collected detailed information on the interview process, including infor-
mation on the interviewees’ tenure in the company, tenure in the post, seniority, gen-
der, and interviewer identifiers. We use these variables to account for measurement
error in the survey variables across some specifications.
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Aas discussed below, there is considerable variation within our sample.
Moreover, despite this compensation level difference, respondents and
nonrespondents have a similar career path, as we find no difference in the
average yearly rate of pay growth. Finally, while social security data do not
contain information on incentive policies, we can proxy sensitivity of pay
to performance by calculating the standard deviation of pay of the same
manager across years in the same firm. Table B1 in appendix B shows that
respondents and nonrespondents do not differ on this dimension.
B. Firm Characteristics and Performance
The main characteristics of our sample firms are summarized in table 1,
panel A. The table shows that family ownership is the most common
ownership structure: 47% of the firms are owned by the founder ð19%Þ or
their family ð28%Þ. The percentage of family firms is in line with the find-
ings of La Porta et al. ð1999Þ, who report that 60% of Italian medium-sized
publicly traded firms belong to a family ðincluding both founders and
second-generation firmsÞ. Widely-held firms account for 30% of the sam-
ple.23 The remaining 23% is divided between cooperatives and firms owned
by the state ð8%Þ, firms owned by their management ð2%Þ, and firms
owned by a group of private individuals ð13%Þ. As there is no a priori
reason to believe that the importance attached to the “amenity potential”
of control by these firms is similar to either family firms or widely-held
firms, we keep this category separate in the analysis that follows.
The survey also contains information on firm size, sector, and multi-
national status. Over 90% of the sample firms employ fewer than 500 peo-
ple. In more detail, 39% are small firms with 49 or fewer employees, a fur-
ther 20% have between 50 and 100 employees, and the remaining 41% have
more than 100 employees. All sample firms belong to the service sector,
within which the three most frequent categories are wholesale ð45% of the
sampleÞ, business services ð11%Þ, and retail and specialized IT services
ð4%Þ. Finally, 58% of the firms in our sample are subsidiaries of a multi-
national company, and in 21% of the cases the multinational’s headquar-
ters are in Italy.24
The last three rows of table 1, panel A, report measures of firm per-
formance from Amadeus. For each firm, we use the last year for which
data are available, which is 2007 for 62% of the sample firms and 2006 for
35% of them. We use three measures of performance: labor productivity
ðdefined as operating revenues divided by the number of employeesÞ,23 Widely-held firms are companies for which no party owns more than 25% of
the shares. We also include in this category private equity firms ð8% of the sampleÞ,
but the results are qualitatively similar once we include private equity in the re-
sidual ownership category.
24 Most sample firms are incorporated in the region of Lombardy ð58%Þ, followed
by Emilia ð9%Þ, Lazio ð9%Þ, Veneto ð8%Þ, Piedmont ð5%Þ, and Tuscany ð5%Þ. This
reflects the uneven geographical distribution of firms across the country.
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Aprofits per worker ðcomputed as earnings before interests and tax divided
by the number of employeesÞ, and ROCE ðoperating income scaled with
capital employedÞ. For each measure we drop the top and bottom 1% to
remove outliers possibly due to measurement errors. Table 1 shows that
the distribution of productivity and profits is heavily skewed to the left
and that the median is much smaller than the mean, indicating that there is
a long tail of firms that perform considerably better than most of the
sample. Finally, we observe considerable heterogeneity along all three
measures—the standard deviation is between 1.3 and 2.3 times the mean.
C. Incentive Policies
The model in Section III illustrates how the choice of incentive policies
attracts different types of managers. To provide evidence on this issue, we
collected information on three types of firm policies that can be made con-
ditional on manager performance: pay, promotions, and dismissals. This
way we obtain a detailed picture of the firms’ incentive policies and can
exploit variation along all three dimensions. For each type of policy, we ask
whether the outcome depends on the manager’s performance and whether
this is evaluated through a formal appraisal system. The latter is crucial to
ensure that managers know the exact mapping from performance to reward,
which determines the effectiveness of the incentive scheme. In fact, our data
shows that two-thirds of the managers who are formally appraised know
exactly how bonus payments are calculated, whereas the corresponding
share in firms that do not have a formal appraisal system is one-half.
To measure the sensitivity of pay to performance, we asked whether
managers can earn a bonus, whether this is a function of performance, and
whether it is awarded through an established appraisal process. We sum-
marize this information into two variables, bonus 1 ðequal to one if bonus
is conditional on performance; zero otherwiseÞ and bonus 2 ðequal to one
if bonus is based on formal appraisal; zero otherwiseÞ. Half of the firms
in our sample offer bonuses as a function of individual or team perfor-
mance targets that are agreed in advance;25 in 33% of firms, bonuses are
awarded through a formal appraisal system ðtable 1, panel BÞ.2625 Overall, 70% of the firms offer a bonus scheme, but for 20% the bonus is
either a function of firmwide performance or awarded at the discretion of the
owners. All the findings that follow are robust to including firmwide or discre-
tionary bonuses in the measure of performance pay.
26 It is important to note that the fact that formal appraisal systems may have
implications for the bonus does not necessarily imply the existence of bonuses re-
lated to individual performance. Managers report that formal appraisal systemsmay
have implications for the bonus in 201 cases of 603. The vast majority of the times
ð77%Þ inwhich appraisalsmay have implications for the bonus, and the bonus exists,
the bonus is linked—albeit not always exclusively—to individual or team perfor-
mance. The rest of the times the bonus is independent of individual performance, but
it is linked to firm performance and/or the discretionary judgement of the owners.
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ATomeasure the effect of performance on the manager’s career prospects
within the firm, we asked whether fast promotion tracks for star perform-
ers exist, whether promotions depend on performance ðas opposed to
tenure or good relationships with the ownersÞ, and whether they are de-
cided through formal appraisals. The variable promotion 1 equals one when
fast tracks exist and zero otherwise. We define promotion 2 to equal one if
performance is an important factor for promotion. Finally, promotion 3
equals one if promotions are decided within a well-defined system of for-
mal appraisal. On average, 37% of sample firms report having fast tracks
for star performers, promotions depend on performance in 74% of the cases,
and 34% of firms have a formal appraisal system to determine promotions
ðtable 1, panel BÞ.
Finally, we measure whether poor performance can be cause for dis-
missal and, again, whether dismissals are decided through a formal ap-
praisal system. The variable firing 1 is equal to one if in the past 5 years
managers have been dismissed due to failure in meeting their perfor-
mance objectives and zero otherwise. Overall, only 11% of firms have dis-
missed managers in the last 5 years, and 5% report doing so because of
poor performance.27 Finally, firing 2 equals one when dismissals are de-
cided through a formal appraisal system ðand zero otherwiseÞ, and this
happens in 23% of the sample firms ðtable 1, panel BÞ.
For parsimony, we combine the various incentive policies in a sole in-
dex that equals the sum of the measures described above ðsee fig. 2Þ. The
findings are qualitatively unchanged if we use other summary measures,
such as the first principal component. The resulting index takes values be-
tween zero and seven, with higher values denoting policies that create a
tighter link between reward and performance. The median firm adopts
two out of the seven incentive policies we consider, and the standard de-
viation of the index is 1.74. Just under 10% of the sample firms offer no ex-
plicit reward for performance, while only 0.5% adopt all seven measures.
D. Manager Characteristics, Pay, and Performance
The manager survey provides a wealth of information on manager
characteristics, summarized in table 1, panel C. Managers are on average
47 years old, and 90% of them are male.28
The theoretical model of Section III implies that a key variable driving
the firm-manager match is the manager’s attitude toward risk. To shed
light on this, we follow an emerging literature that tries to elicit individual27 The other nonexclusive reasons given for dismissals are “poor market con-
ditions” ð4%Þ and “disagreement with the owners” ð6%Þ.
28 This is in line with the figures for the manager population as a whole from
social security records. In the last available year ð2004Þ, average age was 47 and the
share of males was 88%. See Bandiera et al. ð2008Þ for details.
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Arisk preference parameters and characterize their heterogeneity by using
large-scale surveys ðe.g., Barsky et al. 1997; Dohmen et al. 2006; Guiso and
Paiella 2008Þ. Our approach differs from most of the literature that ana-
lyzes the risk-incentive trade-off using measures of the riskiness of the en-
vironment or agents’ wealth as a proxy for their risk aversion. As such, it
does not suffer from the bias caused by endogenous matching and omitted
variables discussed by Ackerberg and Botticini ð2002Þ and Prendergast
ð2002Þ.
We collected a measure of risk attitudes that aims to measure the man-
agers’ own preference for risk. Measures of this sort have been shown to
correlate with actual risk taking in a field experiment by Dohmen et al.
ð2006Þ.
To measure the managers’ own risk preference, we ask them to choose
between a prospect that yields €1 million for sure ðthe safe choiceÞ and a
binary risky prospect that yields €0 with probability p and €10 million
with the complementary probability ð1 2 pÞ, where p varies between 0.01
and 0.8 at intervals of size 0.1. Suppose that for very low probability of
zero return ðand thus a very high probability of making €10 millionÞ, the
manager prefers the risky prospect to €1 million for sure. We take as our
risk attitude measure p*, defined to be the level of p at which the manager
switches from the risky to the safe prospect. Obviously p* is inversely
related to risk aversion, that is, risk-averse managers are willing to bear
losses only if the probability is low. Table 1 shows that the average man-
ager prefers the safe prospect when the risky one fails with probability
0.2 or higher. More interesting, table 1 also shows that managers’ risk at-This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Atitudes are quite heterogeneous—the standard deviation of our measure is
18.94.29
The next set of variables aim to proxy for manager talent. The first two
refer to the managers’ human capital, as measured by college and executive
education degrees. In our sample, 50% of the managers hold a college de-
gree, and 56% hold an executive degree.30 To capture additional aspects of
managerial quality beyond education, we measure “desirability” by ask-
ing managers whether they received any job offer during the 3 years prior
to the interview; 71% reported that this was the case.
It is important to note that the measures of risk attitudes and talent
exhibit independent variation: no correlation between any twomeasures is
higher than 0.06. This is crucial for our purposes as it allows us to identify
matching on risk and talent separately.31
Finally, table 1, panel D reports measures of the managers’ effort, remu-
neration, and job satisfaction. We proxy managerial effort by the number of
hours worked over a week. In our sample 37% of managers work 60 hours
or longer.32 The average annual fixed salary of a manager is approximately29 We also collect two other measures of the manager risk attitude. The first is an
index of the managers’ choice of risk when acting on behalf of the firm. This is
obtained from the answers to the following question: “We would now like you to
think of some important decisions you have taken or might take on behalf of your
firm. These are strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes and a positive corre-
lation between expected earnings and risk. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means
you would choose the safest option with the lowest expected earnings while 10
refers to very risky projects that have a very high rate of return in case of success,
what would you choose?” The average manager is just above the midpoint ð5.7Þ,
and again there is considerable heterogeneity across managers. The second proxy
was obtained from a question asking the manager to state what would be the ideal
proportion between fixed and variable pay linked to individual performance if he/
she could choose among a menu of combinations where a higher proportion of
variable pay corresponded to higher total average pay. Interestingly, these two risk
attitudes measures are strongly correlated with our main indicator of risk tolerance
ðcorrelation coefficients 0.24 and 0.19, respectively, and both are highly statistically
significantÞ. However, compared to the managers’ own risk tolerance, these two
alternative measures may have some shortcomings. First, answers to the first ques-
tion might reflect the type of incentives faced by the manager. Even for the sec-
ond question, the chosen mix may also reflect the riskiness that the manager faces
in the firm rather than preferences for risk. Therefore, we use these measures only
for robustness checks ðsee footnote 36Þ.
30 This relatively low figure is consistent with the information arising from
existing surveys of Italian managers ðsee Bandiera et al. 2008Þ.
31 We discuss in more detail the validity of the risk aversion variable in the
robustness section.
32 To minimize measurement error due to the choice of a particular week, the
survey asks managers to pick the number of hours they work in the “typical” week
out of five possible choices: ðiÞ 40 hours or fewer, ðiiÞ about 40 hours, ðiiiÞ about
50 hours, ðivÞ about 60 hours, ðvÞ 60 hours or more.
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A€100,000,while thebonusamounts, onaverage, to15%of thefixed salary.On
average,managers in our sample receive 4.2 nonmonetary benefits out of a list
of sevenpotential benefits.33Finally50%of themanagers inour sample report
tobe“extremely satisfied”with their job.Only5%report tobe“unsatisfied,”
while the remaining part of the sample is “satisfied.”
V. Empirical Analysis: Findings
We organize the empirical evidence in four parts that match the set of
four predictions obtained in Section III.We start by estimating the relation
between the firms’ incentive policies and the risk and talent of the man-
agers they hire in equilibrium. We will show that firms offering stronger
incentives attract managers who are more risk tolerant and more talented.
Second, we estimate the correlation between the strength of incentives
and managers’ outcomes. We will show that managers who are offered
stronger incentives exert more effort, receive higher fixed and variable pay,
receive more nonpecuniary benefits, and are more satisfied with their job.
Third, we estimate the correlation between the weight given to keeping
direct control of the firm ðas proxied by ownershipÞ and the strength of
managerial incentives. We will show that family ownership, which in our
setting reveals a stronger preference for direct control, is negatively cor-
related with the adoption of bonus systems related to individual or team
performance and with the adoption of practices that promote and fire
employees based on their performance. Fourth, we estimate the correla-
tion between incentives and firm performance. We will show that firms
that offer high-powered incentives have higher productivity, profits, and
returns on capital.
It is important to clarify that our aim is to present evidence on a rich set
of equilibrium correlations that are suggested by the theory. We do not, at
any stage, aim at identifying the causal effect of ownership on incentives
or incentives on performance, as neither varies exogenously. However, at
the end of this section, we discuss a number of alternative interpretations
of our findings. We argue that, when taken together, our evidence, while
consistent with the matching model, is not consistent with any of these
alternatives.
A. Incentives and Managers’ Characteristics
We begin by testing implication 1, namely, that high-powered in-
centives attract managers who are less risk averse and, conditional on risk
aversion, more talented. Starting with risk aversion, we estimate the con-
ditional correlation:33 The list of benefits include: company car ðavailable to 83% of our sample
managersÞ, flexible hours ð85%Þ, telecommuting ð27%Þ, training ð71%Þ, sabbatical
periods ð6%Þ, health insurance ð74%Þ, and life insurance ð74%Þ.
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ARi 5 h
RIj 1 X jz
R 1 Y ij
R 1 eRij ; ð1Þ
where Ri is a measure of the manager risk aversion and Ij is the incentive
policies index. Throughout the empirical analysis, Xj includes the firm’s
multinational status, employment levels, and SIC2 industry codes; Yi in-
cludes the manager’s tenure, seniority level, whether he/she belongs to the
owner family, and his/her operational area ðgeneral administration, finance,
salesÞ.34 Finally, we add interviewers’ dummies and control for the duration
of the interview to account for potential noise in the measurement of the
incentive policies.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 2 estimate ð1Þ for our measure of the man-
ager’s own risk preferences with and without the control vectors Xj and
Yi. Recall that our risk preference measure—the maximum probability of
failure of the risky project that the manager is willing to bear—is inversely
related to risk aversion. Columns 1 and 2 then show that risk-tolerant
managers are more likely to be offered high-powered incentives. The esti-
mates of hR are positive and significantly different from zero at conven-
tional levels. The coefficient estimated in column 2 implies that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the index is associated with a 1.75 increase in the
risk preference measure, or 10% of a standard deviation of the risk toler-
ance measure. This result is robust to adding as a control a measure of man-
ager compensation, thus making certain that the correlation with the power
of incentives does not just reflect a correlation of the latter with income.
It is important to note that the interpretation of the findings is quali-
tatively unaffected if our measure captures the manager’s risk attitudes
when he/she takes a decision on behalf of his/her firm instead of his/her
individual risk aversion parameter gj. If so, our measure effectively cap-
tures bigj, namely, the portion of the risk taken by the firm that goes to the
manager through his/her incentive scheme. Note that the finding that bigj
is smaller when bi is higher implies a fortiori that gj is smaller when b
i is
higher.3534 On average, managers have 6.6 years of tenure ðstandard deviation is 3.6Þ.
Seniority is characteristic of the standardized managerial contract. In our sample,
7% have a lower-management contract, 72% a middle-management contract, and
21% an upper-management contract. Only 2.5% of our sample managers belong to
the family who owns the firm. Finally, by construction, managers are equally split
between the three operational areas.
35 The results shown in cols. 1 and 2 of table 2 are robust to the use of the other
two measures of risk tolerance discussed in footnote 30. One standard deviation
increase in the incentive index is associated with a 0.17 increase in the variable
measuring risk aversion using the manager’s own account of the risks he/she takes
on behalf of the firm, or 10% of its standard deviation. Similar results are found
when we proxy Ri with the manager’s desired share of variable pay.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
T
ab
le
2
In
ce
nt
iv
es
,M
an
ag
er
R
is
k
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s,
an
d
M
an
ag
er
T
al
en
t
R
is
k
:
In
d
iv
id
u
al
P
re
fe
re
n
ce
M
an
ag
er
C
o
ll
eg
e
D
eg
re
e
ð5
1
if
Y
es
Þ
M
an
ag
er
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
ð5
1
if
Y
es
Þ
D
es
ir
ab
il
it
y
ð5
1
if
M
an
ag
er
H
as
R
ec
ei
ve
d
Jo
b
O
ff
er
s
in
P
as
t
3
Y
ea
rs
Þ
ð1
Þ
ð2
Þ
ð3
Þ
ð4
Þ
ð5
Þ
ð6
Þ
ð7
Þ
ð8
Þ
In
ce
n
ti
ve
in
d
ex
.8
68
**
.9
89
**
.0
45
**
*
.0
43
**
*
.0
60
**
*
.0
50
**
*
.0
50
**
*
.0
43
**
*
ð.4
23
Þ
ð.4
81
Þ
ð.0
12
Þ
ð.0
13
Þ
ð.0
11
Þ
ð.0
13
Þ
ð.0
10
Þ
ð.0
12
Þ
R
is
k
:
in
d
iv
id
u
al
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
.0
01
.0
01
.0
01
.0
01
.0
02
**
*
.0
02
**
ð.0
01
Þ
ð.0
01
Þ
ð.0
01
Þ
ð.0
01
Þ
ð.0
01
Þ
ð.0
01
Þ
M
N
E
2
.1
57
2
.0
13
.1
18
**
.0
14
ð1
.8
52
Þ
ð.0
47
Þ
ð.0
48
Þ
ð.0
44
Þ
50
–1
00
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
2
.6
86
.0
60
.0
98
2
.0
03
ð2
.1
87
Þ
ð.0
60
Þ
ð.0
61
Þ
ð.0
57
Þ
10
01
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
2.
40
7
.1
00
*
.1
17
**
.0
63
ð2
.2
00
Þ
ð.0
52
Þ
ð.0
51
Þ
ð.0
45
Þ
C
o
n
st
an
t
18
.1
41
**
*
14
.1
32
*
.3
60
**
*
.3
01
.3
80
**
*
.0
72
.5
32
**
*
1.
44
0*
**
ð1
.3
17
Þ
ð8
.1
52
Þ
ð.0
40
Þ
ð.3
00
Þ
ð.0
40
Þ
ð.3
81
Þ
ð.0
38
Þ
ð.3
17
Þ
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
O
T
E
.—
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
5
60
3.
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
m
an
ag
er
’s
se
n
io
ri
ty
le
ve
l,
w
h
et
h
er
h
e/
sh
e
b
el
o
n
gs
to
th
e
o
w
n
er
fa
m
il
y
,
h
is
/h
er
te
n
u
re
an
d
ca
te
go
ry
ðg
en
er
al
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
,fi
n
an
ce
,s
al
es
Þ,i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
fo
r
th
e
fi
rm
’s
SI
C
2
co
d
es
,d
u
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
in
te
rv
ie
w
,a
n
d
in
te
rv
ie
w
er
d
u
m
m
ie
s.
R
is
k
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
is
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
fa
il
u
re
th
e
m
an
ag
er
is
w
il
li
n
g
to
b
ea
r
to
ch
o
o
se
a
ri
sk
y
in
ve
st
m
en
t
p
ro
je
ct
th
at
y
ie
ld
s
€1
0
m
il
li
o
n
if
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
an
d
€0
if
n
o
t,
in
st
ea
d
o
f
a
sa
fe
p
ro
je
ct
th
at
y
ie
ld
s
€1
m
il
li
o
n
w
it
h
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
.
M
N
E
5
m
u
lt
in
at
io
n
al
en
te
rp
ri
se
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
*
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
**
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l.
**
*
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
652 Bandiera et al.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicag.
.
,
,The second part of implication 1 indicates that, conditional on risk
aversion, high-powered incentives attract more talented managers. To test
this, in table 2, columns 3–8, we estimate the conditional correlation:
Ti 5 h
TIj 1 l
TRi 1 X jz
T 1 Yij
T 1 eTij ; ð2Þ
where Ti are measures of the manager’s talent, Ri is the measure of the
manager’s own risk tolerance, and all the other variables are defined above
The findings provide broad support for the prediction that “better” man-
agers are attracted by steep incentives. For all our measures of talent, hT
is positive and significantly different from zero at conventional levels
Namely, managers who work under high-powered incentives are more
likely to have a college degree, to have attained executive education, and
to be “desirable,” defined as having received job offers from other firms in
the last 3 years. Using the estimates with the full set of controls, we find that
one standard deviation increase in the incentive index increases the proba-
bility that the manager has a college degree by 0.08 ð16% of the uncondi-
tional meanÞ, that he/she has an executive education degree by 0.10 ð18%
of the meanÞ, and that he/she has received outside offers by 0.08 ð17% of
the meanÞ. Finally, we note that there is a positive correlation between firm
size and managerial talent: larger firms are more likely to hire more skilled
managers. This is in line with the prediction of a large class of manager-firm
matchingmodels, from Lucas ð1978Þ to Rosen ð1982Þ to Tervio¨ ð2008Þ.
B. Incentives and Managers’ Outcomes
Implication 2 links the firms’ incentive policies to managers’ effort, pay
and job satisfaction. It predicts that, holding constant their risk tolerance
managers who are offered steeper incentives work harder, receive higher
fixed and variable pay, and have higher utility. To provide evidence on
this, table 3 reports estimates of the conditional correlation:
Oi 5 h
OIj 1 l
ORi 1 X jz
O 1 Y ij
O 1 eOij ; ð3Þ
whereOi are measures of manager outcomes and all the other variables are
defined above. Proxying effort by hours worked, columns 1 and 2 show
that managers who are offered steeper incentives work longer hours. The
estimate of hO is positive and statistically and economically significant.One
standard deviation increase in the incentive index is associated with a 0.06
increase in the probability that the manager works more than 60 hours per
week, which corresponds to 16% of the sample mean.
Columns 3–6 of table 3 show that managers who are offered steeper in-
centives receive higher fixed and variable pay. The estimates of hOwith the
full set of firm and manager controls indicate that one standard deviation
increase in the incentive index is associated with an increase of €2,900
in fixed pay and an even larger amount of €4,375 in variable pay. Theseo.edu/t-and-c).
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,correspond to 10%and 25%of one standard deviation in fixed and variable
pay, respectively. In line with the predictions of Zabojnik and Bernhardt
ð2001Þ, we find that fixed pay is positively correlated with firm size.
Managers who are offered steeper incentives also receive a larger num-
ber of job benefits. The estimates in column 8 of table 3 imply that one
standard deviation increase in the incentive index is associated with 0.24
more benefits, equal to 17% of a standard deviation of the number of ben-
efits in the sample.
Finally, to measure the managers’ level of utility, we ask them to report
their level of satisfaction on the job. Only 5% report to be unsatisfied, while
45% are satisfied and 50% are very satisfied. Columns 9 and 10 show that
managers who are offered steeper incentives feel happier. According to the
estimate in column 10, one standard deviation increase in the incentive in-
dex is associated with a 0.06 increase in the probability that the manager
reports to be very satisfied, which is as large as 12% of the sample mean.
C. Firm Ownership and Incentives
Implication 3 predicts that firms attaching a higher weight to direct
control ðF-firms in our notationÞ will tend to offer a weaker link between
reward and performance thanN-firms. We exploit the difference between
family firms and firms owned by disperse shareholders to proxy for the F-
firms and N-firms described in our model. In particular, our key assump-
tion is that families put more weight on direct control than shareholders
of widely-held firms, such that fF < fN.
This choice is rooted in the family firms literature ðdiscussed in the In-
troductionÞ, which documents how family-owners often perceive the firm
as an opportunity to address family issues and frictions. In this context
owners attribute a value to thefirm as an “amenities provider,” even though
the provision of such amenities might not be profit maximizing ðKets de
Vries 1993Þ. Alternatively, since the boundaries of the firm and those of
the family are less clearly defined in family firms, the transfer of these ame-
nities from the firm to the family is more efficient in family firms, and thus
more of these amenities are transferred. In either case, fF < fN.
Unconditionally we find that family firms do offer a weaker link be-
tween reward and performance than dispersed shareholders firms. Fam-
ily firms are less likely to offer bonuses based on individual performance
ð44% vs. 57%Þ, to have promotion fast tracks ð32% vs. 41%Þ, and to have
dismissed managers for failure to meet performance targets ð3% vs. 6%Þ
Family firms are also less likely to award bonuses, decide on promotions
and fire employees through a formal appraisal process, and in all cases the
gap between the two types of firms is not only statistically significant ðsee
the last columnÞ but also substantial. Only performance seems to matter
for promotions regardless of ownership.
In table 4, we test whether these differences are robust to controlling
for a rich set of manager and firm characteristics, which might create ao.edu/t-and-c).
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Aspurious correlation between firm ownership and incentive policies. We
estimate the conditional correlation:
Pij 5 a
FDFj 1 a
oDoj 1 X jb1 Yid1 εij; ð4Þ
where Pij are the different incentive policies adopted by firm j as reported
by manager i; DFj 5 1 if firm j belongs to its founder or a family, and
0 otherwise; and DOj 5 1 if the firm belongs to the government, a coop-
erative, or its managers, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is aF,
namely, the difference in incentive policies between family-owned and
dispersedly-owned firms, and Xj and Yi are the vectors of firm, manager,
and interview controls defined above.
Table 4 shows that the difference in personnel policies between family
firms and firms owned by disperse shareholders are robust to the inclu-
sion of this rich set of controls. The first two columns estimate ð4Þ for the
aggregate index built as the sum of all seven policy measures. Both in
columns 1 and 2, aF is negative and significantly different from zero at
conventional levels. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that the
differences between family and dispersed-shareholder firms are large: with
the full set of controls, the incentive index is 0.51 points smaller in family
compared to dispersedly-owned firms. This difference amounts to 18%
of the sample mean and 30% of a standard deviation of the incentive in-
dex. The remaining columns estimate ð4Þ for the three subcomponents of
the index: bonuses, promotions, and dismissals. Throughout, aF is negative
and significantly different from zero at conventional levels, indicating that
family firms choose low-powered incentives on all dimensions.
Table 4 also shows that high-powered incentives are more likely to be
offered by firms that are part of multinational corporations. None of the
other controls are correlated with incentive policies. Namely, the strength
of incentives is not correlated with firm size or industry sector or with the
managers’ tenure, seniority, and operational area.3636 The lack of correlation between the steepness of the incentive scheme and firm
size is at odds with the findings reported in Schaefer ð1998Þ, which shows that the
incentives of US CEOs fall in strength roughly with the square root of firm size.
There are many possible reasons behind this discrepancy. First, it is important
to emphasize that the two papers follow different approaches in measuring the
strengths of incentives faced by managers. While this paper infers it from an index
that captures the number and type of incentive tools used by the firm, Schaefer
ð1998Þ directly estimates the sensitivity of totalmanager’s paywith his performance
using CEO pay data. While the former approach is consistent with existing con-
tributions in the personnel economics literature ðe.g., BloomandVanReenen 2007Þ,
the latter approach is standard in the literature on incentive compensation. Second,
Schaefer ð1998Þ is based on a sample of very large ðwith assets worth $3,775 million
on averageÞ and listedUSfirms,whilewe look atmuch smaller firms ð$3.3million in
assets on average andonly 1.4% listedon the stockmarketÞ. Third, our sizemeasures
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AWhile the findings are consistent with implication 3, and hence with the
assumption that family firms put more weight on the “amenity value” of
control, εij contains all other unobservable characteristics that differ by
ownership and could be driving the results. For instance, family firms
might have better monitoring technology and hence less need to offer per-
formance incentives. We will discuss this and other alternative explana-
tions in Section VI.
D. Incentives and Firm Outcomes
The final step of our analysis presents evidence on implication 4, which
suggests a positive correlation between incentive policies and firm per-
formance. Although, as previously stated, our data do not allow us to iden-
tify a causal relationship, we are nevertheless interested in establishing
whether the data are consistent with this model prediction.
In table 5, we estimate the conditional correlation over a repeated cross
section:
Zjt 5 vIj 1 X jtc1 kt 1 qjt; ð5Þ
where Zjt measures the performance of firm j in year t, kt are year fixed
effects, and all other variables are as defined above. We consider three al-
ternative measures of firm performance: ðaÞ labor productivity ðlog of
sales/employeesÞ, ðbÞ profits per employee, and ðcÞ return on capital em-
ployed, all measured yearly for the period 2004–7. To account for the fact
that error terms qjt are correlated within firms across years, we cluster the
standard errors at the firm level. Firm performance measures are obtained
by matching our survey data with Amadeus, an extensive accounting da-
tabase covering more than 9 million public and private companies across
Europe, of which approximately 580,000 are in Italy.37 Once we clean the37 To match the two data sets, we use the unique company identifier Codice
Cerved.
ðdummies for the average number of employees in the firmÞ might simply be too
rough to estimate the effects reported by Schaefer. Fourth, and perhaps more im-
portant, Schaefer focuses exclusively onCEOs and topmanagers, while our sample
also includes managers lower down the hierarchy. Interestingly, in spite of all the
differencesmentioned above,whenwe restrict the sample to the set of 126managers
who report to be “top managers” ði.e., reporting directly to CEOsÞ, we find some
evidence that the incentive index decreases with firm size. In fact, when we repeat
the regression shown in table 5, col. 2, relating the incentive index with firm
ownership and firm characteristics, the coefficient ðstandard errorÞ on the dummy
denoting firms with 50–100 employees is20.670 ð0.690Þ, and the coefficient ðstan-
dard errorÞ on the dummy denoting firms with 100 employees or more is 21.076
ð0.584Þ ðwith the omitted category being firms with less than 50 employeesÞ. This
finding is driven by all components of the incentive index, and in particular by the
set of questions measuring the presence of monetary bonuses linked to individual
performance and awarded through formal appraisal systems.
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Aaccounting data, dropping the first and the bottom percentiles of the
performance variables and taking into account missing observations for
some items, we end up with a sample of 554 observations.38
The estimation results are reported in table 5. Two points are worth
noting. First, the incentive index carries a positive coefficient significant
at conventional levels for all measures of productivity. A one standard de-
viation increase in the incentive index is associated with a 5%, 8%, and 9%
of a standard deviation increase of log-productivity, profits, and return
on capital, respectively. Second, this finding is robust to controlling for
ownership structure; namely, it is not merely due to the incentive index
capturing systematic differences in performance directly due to different
ownership structures. The estimates of the coefficient on family ownership
is negative throughout but only precisely estimated for labor productivity.
Thus, once differences in the power of incentives are accounted for, we
find no evidence of a systematic difference in profits between family and
shareholder owned firms, a feature itself in linewith the implications of our
model with endogenous firm entry.
VI. Robustness and Alternative Interpretations
A. Unobserved Heterogeneity in Manager Characteristics
The residuals in ð1Þ, ð2Þ, and ð3Þ contain unobservable manager char-
acteristics that can generate a spurious correlation between the incentive
index and the outcome of interest. This concern is particularly serious in
survey data because unobservable psychological characteristics of the re-
spondent may lead to systematic misreporting. For instance, managers
who are more self-confident might be more likely to overestimate their
control over their pay; hence, they are more likely to report facing high-
powered incentives and at the same time more likely to take risks and to
overestimate their earnings. Unobservable self-confidence could therefore
generate a spurious correlation between incentive power and risk tolerance
and between incentive power and earnings.
We note that this concern is relevant for all the findings that rely on self-
reported measures on the left-hand and right-hand side of the equation,
namely, those in tables 2 and 3. Findings that rely on variation in firm
ownership or performance ðtables 4 and 5Þ are unaffected as these are not
subject to reporting bias.
We can probe the robustness of our survey data directly using social
security records that contain detailed information on the managers’ pay
and occupation since the beginning of their careers. Hence, we can esti-
mate ð3Þ using the social security administrative earnings data that are not
affected byperception errors or othermanagers’ unobservable traits, which38 The results are qualitatively similar without these cleaning procedures.
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Acould in turn contaminate self-reported variables. Table 6 reports the esti-
mates of
Qi 5 JIj 1 l
QRi 1 Y iw1 z i; ð6Þ
where Qi is the logarithm of manager i’s pay, Ri is the measure of the
manager’s own risk tolerance, and the vector of controls Yi includes the
manager’s seniority level, whether he/she belongs to the owner family,
his/her tenure in the current firm, firm category ðgeneral administration,
finance, salesÞ, overall tenure since his/her first job, the number of firms
he/she has worked for, the average number of weeks worked in a year,
duration of the interview, and interviewer dummies. For comparison, col-
umns 1 and 2 table 6 report the estimate of ð6Þ using pay data from the
survey, whereas in columns 3 and 4, we use pay data from the social se-
curity records. Throughout, J is positive and precisely estimated. More-
over, the estimates of J obtained with our survey data or with the social
security records are quantitatively similar, reassuring us directly on the re-
liability of our survey earnings and indirectly on our incentive index.
Since the social security records contain information on the managers’
entire careers, we can further refine the evidence that incentive policies are
matched to the managers’ type by regressing managerial pay in previous
jobs on current incentives. Under the plausible assumption that managers’
risk attitudes and ability are stable traits, one should find that a given man-
ager matches with firms that offer similar types of incentive contracts. Con-
sistent with this, columns 5 and 6 show that managers who currently face
high-powered incentives had higher levels of pay throughout their career.
Furthermore, while the social security records do not contain infor-
mation on the managers’ risk preferences, they allow us to measure earn-
ings variability, which, by revealed preference, is an indicator of the risk
the manager is willing to bear. To provide further evidence on the validity
of our incentive measure, we exploit the time variation in earnings in the
social security records and test whether high-powered incentives result
in a higher earnings variability, as they should if the managers who face
steep incentives bear more risk in equilibrium.39 We estimate the same
specification as in ð6Þ with the standard deviation of yearly pay computed
over the managers’ time at the firm on the left-hand side. Columns 7–10
show that earnings variability and the power of incentives are correlated:39 In our model, earnings variability can be computed directly. The realized
wage variance is
Var wð Þ5 Var biyj
 
5 bið Þ2j2:
Hence, the realized standard deviation is linear in the power of the incentive con-
tract faced by the manager.
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:managers hired by firms that offer high-powered incentives face more
earnings variability and have done so throughout their careers. This is ad-
ditional evidence in support of our matching model: throughout his/her
career, a bold, talented manager tends to be matched with firms that offer
steep incentives.
Another potential concern is that our risk aversion measure is corre-
lated with other unobservable personal characteristics, which in turn may
determine matching and incentive preferences. While this hypothesis can-
not be verified within our data set, we can explore this question using an-
other survey of 2,295 Italian entrepreneurs and managers, which is focused
on the measurement of risk aversion ðmeasured in the very same way used
in this paperÞ and its link with other managerial characteristics ðGuiso and
Rustichini 2011Þ. In line with our results, risk aversion is not statistically
correlatedwithmeasures of cognitive ability.Reassuringly, the risk aversion
measure is also not statistically correlatedwithmanagerial personality traits
that could affect the matching process, such as optimism, confidence, and
the ability to sustain effort. On the other hand, we find evidence that our risk
aversion measure is correlated with actual risk-taking behavior of managers
outside theirwork environment. Appendix B discusses data and results of the
external validation analysis in more detail.
A final cause for concern is that the incentive structure faced by an
individual manager might not be representative of all managers in the firm
Two points are of note. First, to the extent that different managers within
the same firm face different incentive structures, so that the structure re-
ported by the managers we interview is a noisy proxy for the firms
“average” policy, all correlations between the incentive index and firm-
level variables ðownership and performanceÞ are biased downward because
of measurement error. Second, managers can only report about their own
incentives on dimensions they have experienced, that is, bonuses and pro-
motions. Their report on dismissal policies, however, must reflect the
firm’s average practices as the managers themselves have not been dis-
missed by the current firm. The fact that our findings are robust to using
only the dismissal dimension provides reassurance on the practical rele-
vance of this concern.
B. Alternative Interpretations
Taken together our findings are consistent with the rich set of equi-
librium correlations suggested by the model outlined in Section III. Incen-
tive policies are correlated with the type of managers hired in equilibrium
the strength of incentives is positively correlated with the managers’ risk
tolerance and with their talent. Incentive policies are also correlated with
managers’ effort, their compensation package, and their utility: managers
who face stronger incentives work harder, receive higher fixed and variableo.edu/t-and-c).
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Apay, and ðnot obviouslyÞ are happier. Ownership type is correlated with
incentive policies: compared to firms owned by disperse shareholders, fam-
ily firms offer lower-powered incentives. Finally, stronger incentives are
positively correlated with firm performance.
Although some of these results have already been observed in isolation
in previous work, this is the first time that specific personnel policies are
analyzed in conjunction with such a rich array of firm and manager char-
acteristics. Compared to prior studies, this gives us the unique opportu-
nity to explore the validity of alternative theories that have been proposed
in the past, especially with regard to the understanding of the difference
between family firms and other types of ownership.
For example, similarly to what we show in table 4, Bloom and Van
Reenen ð2007Þ report that family-owned firms are less likely to adopt
“modern” management practices, which include basic practices related to
the provision of performance incentives and the adoption of practices that
promote and dismiss workers based on their performance. The absence of
detailed information on workers’ effort and characteristics, however,
complicates the interpretation of this finding. First, family firms may have
better monitoring technology and hence less need to offer explicit per-
formance incentives ðRoe 2003; Mueller and Philippon 2006Þ. This would
explain the observed correlation between ownership and incentives. A re-
lated hypothesis is that family firms may have access to other technologies
to motivate managers, for example, nontaxable benefits, and hence do not
need to offer explicit monetary incentives to reward performance, so that
effective performance is better rewarded even if incentives are low.
Having data on all sides of the match, we are able to show that both
hypotheses—the family firm advantage in monitoring and motivating
their employees—are actually not supported by the data. For example, if
family firms were better at monitoring their employees, this would imply
a comparative advantage in incentive provision, which in turn would lead
to three conclusions, which are all falsified in the data. First, managers
who face better monitoring should work harder. To the extent that hours
worked are a proxy for effort, the estimates of ð3Þ indicate that the op-
posite is true: managers who face weaker explicit incentives work less
hard.40 Second, better monitoring implies higher productivity. In a com-
petitive labor market, where firms are competing to hire managers, more
productive managers should be paid more. The findings suggest that the
opposite is true: both fixed and variable pay are lower in family firms.
Third, if effort and talent are complements in the production function ðas
it is standard to assumeÞ, a comparative advantage in monitoring should40 Of course, one can always argue that the number of hours and weekends
worked is not a good proxy for effort.
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Atranslate into a comparative advantage in employing talented managers.
But the estimates of ð2Þ suggest the opposite: managers who face stronger
incentives are more talented. Similarly, if family firms were better at mo-
tivating their employees, we should observe low-powered incentives to be
correlated with higher managerial talent and effort. The estimates of ð2Þ
and ð3Þ indicate the opposite.
As a further check, we investigate whether family firms might offer
flatter incentives as they happen to be in sectors where managerial effort is
less relevant. To shed light on this hypothesis we estimate ð4Þ without
industry controls, then with SIC2 industry codes, and finally with SIC3
industry codes. The estimated coefficient of family ownership in the three
specifications is 2.57, 2.53, and 2.59, significantly different from zero at
the 5% level. The fact that the estimated coefficient of family ownership
remains constant as we add increasingly fine industry controls rules out
the possibility that family-owned and widely-held firms sort into different
sectors. While it remains possible that firms sort within each three-digit
industry, for instance, different types of beauty salons or dry cleaners, the
extent to which the returns to managerial effort can differ within such
narrowly defined groups is likely to be limited.
VII. Conclusions
Personnel economics models produce an array of testable predictions
on how workers and firms match, how firm characteristics drive incentive
schemes, how incentives determine worker behavior, and how worker
behavior determines firm performance. Due to data limitations, previous
empirical work focused on individual predictions.
This paper has explored the potential of utilizing integrated personnel
data, combining information about the worker’s characteristics, the firm’s
characteristics, and the terms of the ðimplicit and explicitÞ contract linking
the worker and the firm. A wide array of empirical regularities can be ac-
counted for by a simple model where incentives and matches are endoge-
nously determined.
The combination of novel and comprehensive data and a simple theory
that features widely shared heterogeneity in firms’ governance has allowed
us to make progress along two lines. First, we showed the key relevance of
a manager’s willingness to bear risk as well as talent as key factors in driv-
ing matching with firms. Highly talented and risk-tolerant managers tend
to match with firms that value these characteristics the most. Second, we
offered a unified account of several findings in the literature treated so far
in isolation and sometimes thought to be independent instead of stem-
ming from the same problem.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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AAppendix A
Formal Result and Proofs
The entire model presented in Section III yields the following equilib-
rium characterization.41
Proposition 1
Suppose that g is sufficiently small. In equilibrium, N-firms and
F-firms use contracts with slopes
b^N gj
 
5
fN
11 gjj
2
:
b^F gj
 
5
fF
11 gjj
2
:
Manager j is matched with an N-firm if and only if
vj ≥
2 pN 2 pFð Þ
f2N 2 f
2
F
11 gjj
2
 
; ðA1Þ
and, if not, he/she is matched with an F-firm if and only if
vj ≥
2pF
f2F
11 gjj
2
 
; ðA2Þ
where
pF 5
f2F 21 gj
2ð Þg
D
vg;
pN5
f2N 21 gj
2ð Þg1 f2F f2N 2 f2F
 
D
vg;
with
D5 f2F 1 f
2
N
 
21 gj2ð Þg1 21 gj 2ð Þ2g2 1 f2F f2N 2 f2F
 
:
Equation ðA1Þ is the condition that determines the boundary between
the N-region and the F-region. Similarly, ðA2Þ describes the boundary
between the F-region and the unemployment region. The proposition also
provides precise expressions for the management-related equilibrium pay-
offs pF and pN, which in turn pin down the region boundaries. It is im-
mediately visible that the management-related payoff is greater inN-firms41 The technical condition that g is sufficiently small ði.e., there is more het-
erogeneity in talent than in risk aversionÞ guarantees that the regions depicted in
fig. 1 are trapezoids rather than triangles. If the condition fails, one would have a
different characterization but with similar properties.
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advantage that N-firms have when it comes to incentive provision.
The proof of proposition 1 follows the informal discussion above, with
the addition of a somewhat laborious computation of the actual fixed
point of the matching problem.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the CARA assumption, if w is normally distributed, the man-
ager’s expected payoff can be written as
E u½ 5 E w½ 2 1
2
gV w½ 2 1
2
x2:
Given a and b, the manager chooses x to maximize EðuÞ:
x^5 arg max
x
E w½ 2 1
2
gV w½ 2 1
2
x2
5 arg max
x
a1 bE y½ 2 1
2
b2gV y½ 2 1
2
x2
5 arg max
x
a1 bE
ﬃﬃ
v
p
j x1 εð Þ
h i
2
1
2
b2gV
ﬃﬃ
v
p
j x1 εð Þ
h i
2
1
2
x2
5 arg max
x
a1 b
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
x2
1
2
b2gvjj
2 2
1
2
x2:
The first-order condition on x yields
x^j 5 b
i
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
:
The manager’s expected payoff is, hence,
E Uj
 
5 ai 1 bi
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
x^2
1
2
bið Þ2gjvjj2 2
1
2
x^2j
5 ai 1 bið Þ2vj 2 1
2
bið Þ2gvjj2 2 1
2
bið Þ2vj:
The expected payoff for a firm that employs manager j at wage ða, bÞ is
E Vi½ 5 E yj 2wij 1 hg 2 ki
h i
1 12 fg
 
G2 bivj
 
5 bivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj 1 hg 2 ki 1 12 fg
 
G2 bivj
 
:
Let Sij 5 E Uj
 
1 E Vi½  denote the total surplus generated by the match
between firm i and manager j. As the fixed component can be used to dis-
tribute the surplus between the firm and the worker, it is easy to see that
the firm will always want to maximize surplus and pay the manager his/
her reservation wage ðdetermined in equilibrium by what he/she could get
if he/she worked for another firmÞ.o.edu/t-and-c).
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AThe surplus is
Sij 5 E Uj
 
1 E Vi½ 
5
	
fgb
i 2
1
2
11 gj 2ð Þ bið Þ2


vj 1 ðhg 2 ki 1 12 fg
 
GÞ:
Differentiating the surplus function with respect to bi, we obtain the op-
timal contract slope:
bi 5
fg
11 gjj
2
:
Hence, the maximal surplus is
Sij 5 fg
fg
11 gjj
2
2
1
2
11 gjj
2
  fg
11 gjj
2
 !2 !
vj 1 h
g 2 ki 1 12 fg
 
G
 
5
1
2
f2g
11 gjj
2
vj 1 h
g 2 ki 1 12 fg
 
G
 
:
Restrict attention to the first term of Sij, which can be thought of as the
management-related component of the match surplus. It depends on fg.
We let
SF vj; gj
 
5
1
2
f2F
11 gjj
2
vj;
SN vj; gj
 
5
1
2
f2N
11 gjj
2
vj:
Next we examine match stability. Note that for all vj and gj,
SN vj; gj
 
> SF vj; gj
 
:
Also, given vj ≥ vk and gj ≤ gk ðwith at least a strict inequalityÞ, the fol-
lowing three inequalities hold:
SN vj; gj
 
> SN vk; gkð Þ;
SF vj; gj
 
> SF vk; gkð Þ;
SN vj; gj
 
2 SF vj; gj
 
> SN vk; gkð Þ2 SF vk; gkð Þ:
Given two managers j and k with vj > vk and gj < gk, the following three
statements are always false ðbecause they contradict, respectively, one of
the three inequalities just stated—a new match could be formed with a
higher surplusÞ:This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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A• Manager k works for an N-firm and manager j is unemployed.
• Manager k works for an F-firm and manager j is unemployed.
• Manager k works for an N-firm and manager j works for an F-firm.
This restricts the shape of the regions of manager types that work forN,
F, or are unemployed. It is easy to see that if g is sufficiently small, the
regions must be trapezoids, as in figure 1.
Note that we can write
SF vj; gj
 
5 E Uj
 
1 fFb
ivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj;
SN vj; gj
 
5 E Uj
 
1 fNb
ivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj:
Perfect competition among firms means that all F-firms must have the
same management-related payoff:
pF 5 fFb
ivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj;
and all N-firms must have the same management-related payoff
pN 5 fNb
ivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj:
A manager j who is employed by an F-firm receives expected utility
uj 5 SF vj; gj
 
2 pF ;
and every manager j that is employed by an N-firm receives utility
uj 5 SN vj; gj
 
2 pN:
The managers on the line that separates the F region from the unem-
ployment region receive their outside option: zero. Hence, all the surplus
goes to the firm
SF vj; gj
 
5 pF :
The managers on the line that separates the F region and the N region are
indifferent between working for an N-firm and an F-firm. Hence,
SN vj; gj
 
2 pN 5 SF vj; gj
 
2 pF :
These two indifference conditions can be applied to the extreme cases:
gj 5 0 and gj 5 g, yieldingThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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ASF tF ; 0ð Þ5 pF ;
SF sF ; gð Þ5 pF ;
SN tN; 0ð Þ2 SF tN; 0ð Þ5 pN2pF ;
SN sN; gð Þ2 SF sN; gð Þ5 pN2pF :
We can rewrite the first four equations as
1
2
f2FtF 5 pF ;
1
2
f2F
11 gj2
sF 5 pF ;
1
2
f2NtN 2
1
2
f2FtN 5 pN2pF ;
1
2
f2N
11 gj2
sN 2
1
2
f2F
11 gj2
sN 5 pN2pF:
That is,
tF 5
2pF
f2F
;
sF 5
2pF
f2F
11 gj2ð Þ;
tN 5
2 pN 2 pFð Þ
f2N 2 f
2
F
;
sN 5
2 pN 2 pFð Þ
f2N 2 f
2
F
11 gj2ð Þ:
The area of the regions ðtrapezoidsÞ correspond to the mass of firms in
business. Hence,
tF 1 sFð Þg
2
5 vg2 nF2nN;
tN 1 sNð Þg
2
5 vg2nN:
Then
pF
f2F
21 gj2ð Þg5 vg2 nN2nF ; ðA3Þ
pN 2 pF
f2 2 f2
21 gj2ð Þg5 vg2nN: ðA4Þ
N FThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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AFinally, the entry condition on F-firms implies that the expected payoff of
the least profitable F-firm ðlet us call it i Þ is zero:
E Vi½ 5 E yj 2wij 1 hF 2 ki
h i
1 12 fFð Þ GF 2 bivj
 
5 bivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj 1 hF 2 ki 1 12 fFð Þ GF 2 bivj
 
5 pF 1 hF 2 k
i 1 12 fFð ÞGF 5 0;
implying
k
i 5 pF 1 hF 1 12 fFð ÞGF :
As there are k
i F-firms with a lower k, the mass of active F-firms is
nF 5 pF 1 hF 1 12 fFð ÞGF :
Similarly, the mass of active F-firms is
nF 5 pF :
Hence, ðA3Þ and ðA4Þ become
pF 21 gj
2ð Þg5 f2F vg2 pN 1 hN 1 12 fNð ÞG2 pF 2 hF 2 12 fFð ÞG
 
;
pN 2 pFð Þ 21 gj2ð Þg5 f2N 2 f2F
 
vg2 pN
 
:
Let GF 5 hF 1 12 fFð ÞGF , H 5 21 gj2ð Þg, F ; f2F , and N; f2N 2 f2F .
Then
pFH 5 F vg2 pN 2 pF 2GF
 
;
pN 2 pFð ÞH 5N vg2 pN
 
;
with solution
pF 5 F
Hvg2 H 1Nð ÞGF
2FH 1 FN 1HN 1H2
;
pN 5
FHvg1 FNvg1HNvg2 FHGF
2FH 1 FN 1HN 1H2
;
which can be written as
pF 5
f2F 21 gj
2ð Þg2 21 gj2 1 f2N 2 f2F
 
GF
D
vg;
pN 5
f2F 21 gj
2ð Þgvg1 f2F f2N 2 f2F
 
vg1 21 gj2ð Þg f2N 2 f2F
 
vg2 f2F 21 gj
2ð ÞgGF
D
f2F f
2
N 2 f
2
F
 
vg1 f2N 21 gj
2ð Þvg2 2 f2F 21 gj2ð ÞgGF
D
;This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
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Awith
D5 2FH 1 FN 1HN 1H2
5 2f2FH 1 f
2
F f
2
N 2 f
2
F
 
1H f2N 2 f
2
F
 
1H2
5 f2FH 1 f
2
F f
2
N 2 f
2
F
 
1 f2NH 1H
2
5 f2F 21 gj
2ð Þg1 f2N 21 gj2ð Þg1 21 gj2ð Þ2g2 1 f2F f2N 2 f2F
 
5 f2F 1 f
2
N
 
21 gj 2ð Þg1 21 gj2ð Þ2g2 1 f2F f2N 2 f2F
 
:
Proof of Implication 1
Manager j is characterized by talent vj and risk aversion gj. An increase
in the risk-aversion coefficient gj leads to a decrease in
b^i gj
 
5
fg
11 gjj
2
;
both because fg=ð11 gjj2Þ is decreasing in gj and because, for gj large
enough, the value of b^iðgjÞ jumps from fN=ð11 gjj2Þ down to fFð11
gjj
2Þ.
The contract slope b^i is nondecreasing in vj: while fgð11 gjj2Þ does not
depend on vj, for vj large enough, the value of b^iðgjÞ jumps from fFð11
gjj
2Þ up to fN=ð11 gjj 2Þ.
Proof of Implication 2
For part a, note that the manager’s effort is x^j 5 bi
ﬃﬃﬃ
vj
p
. Hence, it is pos-
itively correlated tobibothdirectly and indirectly ðbecauseby implication1
the contract slope is positively correlated with vjÞ.
Part b is immediate as the ðexpectedÞ variable compensation is bix^j.
Hence, it is increasing in bi both directly and indirectly ðthrough x^j, as per
part aÞ.
It is useful to show part d before part c. The proof relies on a revealed
preference argument. Consider two employed managers with the same risk
aversion coefficient g, but different talent levels: v
00
> v
0
. In equilibrium, the
first manager has contract ða00; b00Þ, while the second receives ða0; b0Þ. We
already know that b00 ≥ b0, but we cannot say anything about the fixed part.
The two managers have, respectively, the following expected utilities
U
00
5 a
00
1 b
00 2
v
00
2
1
2
b
00 2
gv
00
j 2 2
1
2
b
00 2
v
00
;
U
0
5 a
0
1 b
0 2
v
0
2
1
2
b
0 2
gv
0
j 2 2
1
2
b
0 2
v
0
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AIf the v
00
-manager were offered contract ða0; b0Þ and exerted the same ef-
fort as the other manager, he/she would still have a higher utility because
he/she is more productive. By a revealed preference argument, if the man-
ager chooses to work for a firm that offers contractða00; b00Þ and chooses a
higher level of effort, he/she must get a utility level that is at least as high.
For part c, consider the same two managers as in point d and note that
U00 ≥U0 implies that the difference between the expected total compen-
sation of the two managers can be written as
a
00
1 b
00 2
v
00
 
2 a
0
1 b
0 2
v
0
 
≥
1
2
b
00 2
gv
00
j 2 1
1
2
b
00 2
v
00
	 

2
1
2
b
0 2
gv
0
j 2 1
1
2
b
0 2
v
0
	 

5
1
2
gj 2 1 1ð Þ b00 2v00 2 b0 2v0 
≥ 0:
Proof of Implication 4
As we saw in the proof of proposition 1, in equilibrium all F-firms have
the same management-related payoff pF and all N-firms have the same
management-related payoff pN.
Recall that management-related payoff is defined as
pg 5 fgb
ivj 2 a
i 2 bið Þ2vj:
Hence, if pg is constant and the direct-control part of the payoff, namely
2 bið Þ2vj, becomes more negative, the profit part fgbivj2 aimust increase.Appendix B
Risk Aversion Measures: External Validation
In this appendix, we provide some support for the risk aversion mea-
sure we use, in order to address the main concern that it raises: that it may
reflect attributes that we do not observe and cannot control for that hap-
pen to be correlated with the matching between the manager and the firm.
We have already provided evidence that elicited risk attitudes are unlikely
to reflect skills, as measured by educational attainment. Here we use an
external validity test in order to support our contention that answers to
our lottery measures do indeed reflect risk preferences of the managers
and not other potentially matching-relevant traits.
To this end, we rely on a sample of 2,295 Italian entrepreneurs and
managers who participated in the Ania Survey on Small Companies, con-This content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Aducted in 2008 using face-to-face interviews. This survey targeted the CEO
of the company and elicited a large number of relevant traits, including
measures of risk attitudes and abilities. A detailed description of the data
is available in Guiso and Rustichini ð2011Þ.
The managers were asked the exact same investment lottery question
that we employ in this paper, that is, they were asked to reveal their pref-
erences over a lottery. The average level of the risk tolerance indicator
is 20.06, which is very similar to the one in our sample; the standard de-
viation is 26.6, a bit larger than that in our sample. The Ania survey also
provides additional measures of business relevant personality traits and
ability: ðaÞ optimism, ðbÞ an indicator of ðoverÞconfidence, ðcÞ an index of
obstinacy and will power, and ðdÞ a measure of ability to sustain endur-
ing effort. Additionally, the survey provides a rich set of information on
managers’ physical traits and job experience. Finally, matching may be re-
lated to some dimension of personal connections, which could in turn be
correlatedwith risk attitudes. For instance, firmsmay have a preference for
a manager born in the same area where the firm is located. If there is a
systematic relation between place of birth and risk preferences, our cor-
relations may reflect matching on networking and not on risk preferences.
We test this hypothesis including dummies for the region where the man-
ager was born.
In this appendix, we analyze the correlation between our risk aversion
measures and these additional variables. The results of these regressions,
controlling also for CEO demographics and education ða dummy for col-
lege degreeÞ, are shown in table B2. Risk tolerance is decreasing in age
and higher for males, a pattern that has been found in many other studies
of risk attitudes ðe.g., Barsky et al. 1997; Dohmen et al. 2006Þ. Reassur-
ingly, other measures of managerial ability that could in principle be rel-
evant for the matching mechanism are in fact uncorrelated with risk
aversion. For example, job experience, measured by the number of years
the CEO has been in control of the firm and the year he started working,
is uncorrelated with risk tolerance. We also do not find evidence of any
statistical correlation between our measure of risk aversion and CEO
height ðwhich has been found to capture economic success by Persico,
Postlewaite, and Silverman 2004Þ, whether the manager was the firstborn,
and whether the father was an entrepreneur ðproxying for inherited entre-
preneurial abilityÞ. We cannot reject the hypothesis that region of birth
fixed effects have some explanatory power—we cannot reject them being
jointly equal to zero—but their size is small.
The second column of table B2 adds to the specification the grade ob-
tained by the manager at the end of secondary school ðEsame diMaturita`Þ,
a possibly more precise proxy for cognitive ability that we do not have in
our main sample ðsince some managers have not completed secondaryThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:04 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Aschool, the sample size is slightly smallerÞ. Even this more sophisticated
measure of cognitive ability turns out not to be correlated with risk atti-
tudes.
In the third column of table B2, we include as additional regressors the
managerial personality traits described above. Three of the four measures—
optimism, confidence, and ability to sustain effort—are not statistically cor-
related with risk tolerance. The only variable that appears to be correlated
with ourmeasure of risk preferences is obstinacy.CEOswhodonot give up
easily when faced with an unanticipated problem are more risk tolerant. In
so far this attitude is important in the matching mechanism, our measure of
risk preferences captures it as well. On the other hand, obstinacy may be
regarded as a dimension of a person’s risk attitudes in so far as being less
afraid of obstacles because of high persistence means one is also more pre-
pared to take risks.42
Finally, the Ania survey allows us to verify whether the elicited measure
of risk tolerance is able to capture actual risk taking behavior even outside
the manager’s workplace using information on the portfolio allocation of
their private wealth. table B3 shows the results of a Probit regression,
where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the CEO has any
stock of listed companies—an indicator of willingness to take extra risk in
addition to those involved in managing the firm ðand owning shares of
private business wealthÞ. Measured risk tolerance is strongly and posi-
tively correlated with stock ownership, suggesting that our lottery ques-
tion is indeed capturing managerial preferences for risk. Interestingly,
obstinacy has no predictive power once we control for risk attitudes.42 The obstinacy indicator is based on the following question: “If you are trying
to achieve an objective and all of a sudden you are faced with an obstacle, would
you give up as the first difficulties show up or would you never give up?” Provide
your answer on a scale between 0 and 10, with 10 meaning that you would never
give up and zero that you would give up immediately.
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ATable B1
Sample Selection: Probit EstimatesThis content downloade
ll use subject to University of ChicagoPanel A. Firm Characteristicsd from 158.143.197.032 on April 08, 2016 04:06:0
 Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Log ðemploymentÞ 2.032 2.041 2.034 2.033ð.024Þ ð.026Þ ð.024Þ ð.024Þ
Log ðsales/employeesÞ 2.027ð.033Þ
Profits/employees 2.000ð.000Þ
ROCE 2.001ð.001Þ
No. of observations 5,500 5,286 5,389 5,202
Time period 2004–7 2004–7 2004–7 2004–7
No. of firms in population 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,649
No. of firms in sample 560 560 560 557
Sic2 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes YesPanel B. Manager Characteristicsð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ
Log ðageÞ 2.149 2.097 .205 .185 .138ð.220Þ ð.227Þ ð.237Þ ð.239Þ ð.295Þ
Gender ð1 5 menÞ .145 .141 .191* .191* .221*ð.099Þ ð.099Þ ð.101Þ ð.101Þ ð.115Þ
Log ðtenure in current firmÞ 2.032 2.028 2.030 .000ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.078Þ
Log ðcurrent payÞ 2.298*** 2.286*** 2.223*ð.072Þ ð.073Þ ð.128Þ
Log ðmean yearly pay growthÞ 2.046 2.052ð.065Þ ð.083Þ
Log ðstandard deviation of payÞ 2.068ð.079Þ
No. of observations 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,295
No. of managers in population 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,295
No. of managers in sample 572 572 572 572 419NOTE.—Panel A: Dependent variable equals one if the firm is in the sample, zero otherwise. The
number of firms is lower than the population we sampled from ð1,815Þ due to missing values in the balance
sheet data. ROCE 5 operating income scaled with capital employed. Panel B: Dependent variable equals
one if the firm is in the sample, zero otherwise. The number of observations ð1,731Þ is smaller than the
number of managers we sampled from ð1,815Þ due to missing values in the social security records. Tenure
is the number of years the manager has been working for the current firm. Current pay is equal to total
annual pay divided by weeks worked in 2004. Mean yearly pay growth equals the mean yearly change in
pay since the manager’s first job until 2004. The standard deviation of pay is computed over the years
worked in the current firm if the manager has worked for at least 3 years. Both panels: Robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.4 AM
uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ATable B2
Risk Preference, Demographics, Psychological Traits, and TalentThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and CoRisk PreferenceDependent Variable ð1Þ032 on April 
nditions (httpð2Þ08, 2016 04:0
://www.journað3Þ
Age 2.109* 2.177** 2.140*ð.099Þ ð.041Þ ð.050Þ
Age started working .132 .238 .232ð.450Þ ð.303Þ ð.216Þ
No. of years in control 2.067 2.045 2.072ð.230Þ ð.535Þ ð.239Þ
Male 6.913*** 8.462*** 7.653***ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ
Height ðcentimetersÞ 2.052 2.177 2.073ð.591Þ ð.140Þ ð.474Þ
First born 2.806 22.500 2.662ð.513Þ ð.114Þ ð.614Þ
Father entrepreneur 1.154 .727 .844ð.367Þ ð.647Þ ð.533Þ
College degree 3.344** 3.126 1.478ð.049Þ ð.126Þ ð.410Þ
Grade at secondary school diploma .011ð.908Þ
Optimism .008ð.984Þ
ðOverÞconfidence 2.383ð.133Þ
Obstinacy .961**ð.020Þ
Ability to stand effort 2.133ð.598Þ
Constant 20.412 65.291** 29.004ð.255Þ ð.012Þ ð.191Þ
No. of observations 1,952 1,290 1,738
Regional dummies includes ðF-test all equal to zeroÞ 4.21 4.35 3.68
NOTE.—Risk tolerance is the probability at which the manager switches from choosing the risky
prospect yielding €10 million with that probability ðand €0 otherwiseÞ to the safe prospect that yields
€1 million with certainty. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.6:04 AM
ls.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table B3
Financial Risk Taking and Risk Preference
Financial Risk Taking
Dependent Variable ð1Þ ð2Þ
Risk tolerance .001*** .001***
ð.000Þ ð.000Þ
Age .003** .002*
ð.012Þ ð.059Þ
Age started working .003 .004
ð.310Þ ð.122Þ
No. of years in control .001 .001
ð.252Þ ð.313Þ
Male .032 .031
ð.213Þ ð.262Þ
Height ðcentimetersÞ .002 .002
ð.191Þ ð.210Þ
First born 2.000 .005
ð.983Þ ð.814Þ
Father entrepreneur .023 .013
ð.223Þ ð.542Þ
College degree .089*** .066**
ð.000Þ ð.013Þ
Optimism 2.002
ð.756Þ
ðOverÞconfidence .027
ð.246Þ
Obstinacy .008
ð.214Þ
Ability to stand effort .002
ð.585Þ
No. of observations 1,952 1,738
NOTE.—Financial risk taking is a dummy equal to one if the manager has
stocks of listed companies in his personal portfolio besides owing any stock of
his/her firm. Risk tolerance is the probability at which the manager switches
from choosing the risky prospect yielding €10 million with that probability
ðand €0 otherwiseÞ to the safe prospect that yields €1 million with certainty.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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